Centuries of Contract Common Law Can\u27t Be All Wrong: Why the UMA\u27s Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceedings Should Be Embraced and Broadened by Robinson, Peter
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2003 Issue 1 Article 8 
2003 
Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be All Wrong: Why the 
UMA's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement 
Proceedings Should Be Embraced and Broadened 
Peter Robinson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be All Wrong: Why the UMA's Exception to 
Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceedings Should Be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. 
Resol. (2003) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/8 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized 
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Centuries of Contract Common Law
Can't Be All Wrong: Why the UMA's
Exception to Mediation
Confidentiality in Enforcement
Proceedings Should be Embraced and
Broadened
Peter Robinson*
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 136
II. THE UMA's EXCEPTION TO MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED AGREEMENTS ................................................. 137
Ill. SOME JURISDICTIONS EMPLOY EXTREMELY LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO
M EDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY ...................................................................... 137
IV. STRICT MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY CREATES ABSURD ENFORCEMENT
R ESU LTS ......................................................................................................... 142
A. Issues Raised in Proceedings to Enforce Mediated Agreements ............ 143
B. The Enforcement of Settlement Agreements is Normally Governed by the
Law of Contracts ........................................... 148
1. Contract Law Relies on the Totality of the Circumstances to Resolve
Issue Arising Out of Agreements ........................................................ 149
2. Resolving Mediated Agreement Enforcement Issues by an Unfettered
Application of Contract Law .............................................................. 151
a. Cases Questioning Whether there was a Definite Agreement on all
E ssential Term s ............................................................................... 15 1
b. Cases Questioning Whether a Mediated Agreement was Accomplished
by D uress or Coercion .................................................................... 152
c. Cases Questioning Whether an Agreement should be Voided because
of M istake ........................................................................................ 154
d. Cases Questioning the Enforceability of an Agreement because of
F ra ud ............................................................................................... 15 5
e. Cases Questioning the Enforceability of an Agreement as Contrary to
P ublic P olicy ................................................................................... 156
f. Cases Involving Conditions Precedent to Contracts ......................... 157
g. Cases Involving Ambiguous Contract Terms ................................... 157
C. Strict Confidentiality Interferes with the Application of Contract Law to
M ediated A greem ents ............................................................................. 159
* Associate Director of the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution and Assistant Professor of Law at
Pepperdine University School of Law. The author thanks L. Randolph Lowry, Maureen Weston, and
Arthur Pearlstein for their collegial contributions in developing the ideas in this article. This article
was prepared with the exceptional research assistance of Martin DeArcangelis, a J.D. candidate at
Pepperdine University School of Law, and faithful administrative support of Camilla Freedlund.
1
Robinson: Robinson: Centuries of Contract Common Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2003, No. 1
1. The Discussions and Negotiations in Formulating Mediated Agreements
are often Necessary to Apply Contract Law in Enforcement
Proceedings and Exactly Forbidden by Strict Mediation Confidentiality
............................................................................................................ 15 9
2. Strict Mediation Confidentiality Transforms Mediated Agreements into
Sup er C ontracts .................................................................................. 161
3. The Mediated Super Contract Has Serious Ramifications .................. 162
D. This Clash of Titans (Contract Common Law in Enforcement Proceedings
v. Mediation Confidentiality) has Resulted in Unpredictable Legal
O utcom es and Reasoning ....................................................................... 163
1. Piercing Mediation Confidentiality Without Explanation .................. 163
2. Piercing Mediation Confidentiality With Explanation ....................... 165
3. Uphold Mediation Confidentiality With Explanation ......................... 166
4. Uphold Mediation Confidentiality Without Explanation .................... 167
V. THE UMA PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION TO MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY FOR
THE PARTIAL APPLICATION OF CONTRACT LAW WHEN ENFORCING MEDIATED
A GREEM ENTS ................................................................................................. 168
A. The Conditions to Exercise the Exception .............................................. 168
B. The Scope of the Exception ..................................................................... 169
C. The Lim itation to the Exception .............................................................. 170
VI. THE UMA's EXCEPTION TO MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY WHEN ENFORCING
MEDIATED AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE EXPANDED .......................................... 171
A. Conflicting Factual Testimony by the Parties ........................................ 172
B. Mediations with a Prevalence of Private Meetings ................................ 172
C. Complex M ulti-Party M ediations ........................................................... 173
V II. C ONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 173
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association recently approved the Uni-
form Mediation Act ("UMA") with an eye toward unifying the law of mediation
confidentiality in the United States. Soon, numerous states and other organiza-
tions will consider modifying statutes, court rules, or professional standards to
conform to the UMA. One of the important aspects of mediation confidentiality is
how it applies when enforcing a mediated agreement.' In some jurisdictions, me-
diation confidentiality interferes with the application of contract law when enforc-
ing a mediated agreement to produce absurd results. This article will examine the
UMA's exception to mediation confidentiality when enforcing a mediated agree-
ment, and conclude that for some jurisdictions it is a step in the right direction
and, generally, should be expanded.
1. Two scholars whose contributions on this topic have greatly benefited the author are Ellen E.
Deason (Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides with Confidentiality, 35
U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 33 (2001)) and Scott H. Hughes (The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled
Go the Privileges, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 9 (2001)), whose observations sparked an interest in how courts
were handling the conflict between mediation confidentiality and the application of the common law of
contracts in enforcement proceedings.
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II.THE UMA's EXCEPTION TO MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
The UMA's exception to mediator confidentiality in proceedings regarding
the enforcement of mediated agreements is in Section 6. The pertinent parts pro-
vide:
Section 6. Exceptions To Privilege
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative
agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seek-
ing discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evi-
dence is not otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that
substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that
the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove
a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract
arising out of mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation
communication referred to in subsection ... (b) (2)
Before analyzing this exception and suggesting that it be expanded, it is im-
portant to recognize that this standard is more permissive than the current law in
some states. Providing context for comparison will enable a better discussion of
the UMA proposal.
III. SOME JURISDICTIONS EMPLOY EXTREMELY LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO
MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
Many states have statutes that preclude the breaching of mediation confiden-
tiality with the only "exception" to be the presentation of the settlement agreement
to the court.2 A few states have decided against creating an absolute shield around
mediation communications so that mediation confidentiality can be breached to
prevent fraud or manifest injustice. 3 The stricter approach to mediation confiden-
2. See Deason, supra n. 1, at 46 n.33 (citing relevant state statutes: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-
302(2.5) (West 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-235d(b)(2) (Supp. 2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 44.102(3)
(West Supp. 2001); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-813 (3) (1999); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.1 (1) (1999); 42
Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5949(b)(1), (c) (West 2000); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-576.10 (2000) (court ADR
program); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.070(1)(e) (West 1995)).
3. Id. at 48 nn. 38-40 (noting Louisiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin statutes allow courts to breach me-
diation confidentiality if the judge determines that it is necessary to avoid fraud or manifest injustice;
20031
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tiality would prevent courts from exploring and justly deciding controversies that
might arise out of mediated agreements.4
California's mediation confidentiality provisions are illustrative of jurisdic-
tions with extremely limited exceptions to mediation confidentiality.5 In addition
to declaring the contents of a mediation confidential, California's statute requires
all parties to expressly agree to the mediator's release of information regarding a• • 6
mediation (other than whether an agreement was reached) to a civil court. An-
other area of California's Evidence Code goes so far as to declare that mediators
are incompetent to testify in civil proceedings except in contempt or disciplinary
situations.
Two provisions of the California statutory scheme extend mediation confi-
dentiality to prevent testimony in enforcement proceedings. One code section
states that mediation confidentiality shall extend to the same extent after the me-
diation ends.8 Another section specifies the language that needs to be included in
the mediated agreement for the mere written agreement to be admissible for en-
forcement purposes. 9 The result is a mediation confidentiality statutory scheme
citing: La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.023(C)(4) (Anderson
1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 904.085(4)(e) (West 2000)).
4. See infra § IV.B.2.a-g.
5. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 11 19(a)-(c) (West 2001):
(a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course
of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to dis-
covery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, adminis-
trative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law,
testimony can be compelled to be given.
(b) No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the purpose of, in the course
of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is admissible or subject to dis-
covery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administra-
tive adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law,
testimony can be compelled to be given.
(c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants
in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall remain confidential.
6. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1121 (West 2001):
Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to a court or other adjudicative body, and a
court or other adjudicative body may not consider, any report, assessment, evaluation, rec-
ommendation, or finding of any kind by the mediator concerning a mediation conducted by
the mediator, other than a report that is mandated by court rule or other law and that states
only whether an agreement was reached, unless all parties to the mediation expressly agree
otherwise in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118.
7. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 703.5 (West 2001):
No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no arbitrator or media-
tor, shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement,
conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding, except
as to a statement or conduct that could (a) give rise to civil or criminal contempt, (b) consti-
tute a crime, (c) be the subject of investigation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial
Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings under paragraph (1) or (6) of
subdivision (a) of Section 170.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, this section does
not apply to a mediator with regard to any mediation under Chapter 11 (commencing with
Section 3160) of Part 2 of Division 8 of the Family Code.
8. "Anything said, any admission made, or any writing that is inadmissible, protected from disclo-
sure, and confidential under this chapter before a mediation ends, shall remain inadmissible, protected
from disclosure, and confidential to the same extent after the mediation ends." Cal. Evid. Code. Ann.
§ 1126 (West 2001).
9. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1123 (West 2001):
4
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that makes no provisions for exceptions for contract enforcement proceedings
unless all the parties, including the mediator, waive mediation confidentiality. 'o
It should not be a surprise that the courts struggled to apply such a strict me-
diation confidentiality statute with limited exceptions generally and no exceptions
for enforcement purposes. One court created an implied exception to the statute
based on a balancing test to protect a constitutional "due process right" to cross-
examine and impeach a witness in a juvenile delinquency proceeding."
A year later, another court expanded the balancing test creating a judicial ex-
ception to mediation confidentiality in a proceeding to enforce a mediated settle-
ment agreement.' 2 Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co. was decided by U.S. Magis-
trate Judge Wayne Brazil' 3 applying California mediation confidentiality law.
Olam involved an allegation by a 65-year-old woman that her signature on a me-
diated agreement settling a pending civil action had been obtained through "undue
influence."' 4 Both of the parties waived the mediation confidentiality protection
provided by Evidence Code 1119 and requested that the mediator testify in an
Written settlement agreements; conditions to admissibility:
A written settlement agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation, is not made
inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provisions of this chapter if the agreement is
signed by the settling parties and any of the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) The agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure, or words to that ef-
fect.
(b) The agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect.
(c) All parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with Sec-
tion 1118, to its disclosure.
(d) The agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality that is relevant to an issue in
dispute.
10. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1122(a)(1) (West 2001):
Communications or writings; conditions to admissibility:
(a) A communication or a writing, as defined in Section 250, that is made or prepared for
the purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation,
is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provisions of this chapter if ei-
ther of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) All persons who conduct or otherwise participate in the mediation expressly agree
in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to disclosure of the communica-
tion, document, or writing.
11. Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (1998). In Rinaker, the California court of
appeal required a mediator to testify in a juvenile delinquency hearing. Id. at 465. Prior to that hear-
ing, a mediation was conducted in a parallel civil harassment suit brought by the victim of the alleged
juvenile offenders. Id. at 467. At the subsequent juvenile delinquency hearing, defense counsel in-
formed the judge that during mediation the victim, who was the complaining witness in the delin-
quency proceeding, had admitted he had not actually seen the perpetrators of the alleged criminal acts.
Id. Defense counsel also stated that the testimony of the mediator was essential for impeachment
purposes if the witness's testimony in the delinquency hearing was at variance with the witness's
statement in mediation proceeding. Id. The trial court found that California's mediation confidential-
ity statutes did not apply because the delinquency hearing was criminal in nature. Id. at 468. The
California court of appeal countered that juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil in nature but that
the trial court's decision should stand because of due process concerns regarding the cross-examination
of adverse witnesses. Id. at 470. The California court of appeal established precedent for a balancing
test pitting the public policy of mediation confidentiality against other public policy values and if the
latter outweighs the former then confidentiality must yield. Id.
12. Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
13. It is important to recognize that Magistrate Brazil is a knowledgeable and respected supporter of
mediation, so his decision regarding the piercing of mediation confidentiality in the Olam proceeding
is worthy of careful consideration..
14. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
2003]
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evidentiary hearing regarding the enforceability of the mediated agreement.' 5 The
mediator, who was on the staff of the court, was deemed to have a statutory privi-
lege that was not waived. 16 The question for the court was whether the mediator's
testimony could be compelled without the mediator waiving his privilege.1
7
In a lengthy and thoughtful opinion, Judge Brazil carefully acknowledged the
importance that confidentiality provides to the mediation process.' 8 Notwith-
standing, the court employed the two-prong test set out in Rinaker, balancing the
type and magnitude of harm from compelling the mediator to testify, against the
type and magnitude of harm that would result if the mediator's testimony were not
accessible in the pending proceeding. 19
The plaintiff alleged that she had been subjected to undue influence in the
mediation, and that she lacked capacity to understand or consent to the purported
agreement reached in the mediation. 2° If the court found that these allegations
were true, the agreement, as a matter of law, should be voided. Moreover, the
referring court should likely be interested in learning about circumstances of
whether a party or mediator coerced another into reaching an agreement in court-
connected mediation.
Determining that the only reliable evidence as to the plaintiff's condition at
the mediation could come from the mediator, Magistrate Judge Brazil described
the harm of compelling mediator testimony by acknowledging that, ". . .[tjo force
[mediators] to give evidence that hurts someone from whom they actively solic-
ited trust (during the mediation) rips the fabric of their work and can threaten their
sense of the center of their professional integrity." 2' He reasoned that this harm
was at least partially discounted in this case because all parties to the mediation
wanted the mediator to testify.22 He also reasoned that harm of compelling media-
tor testimony "can vary with the nature of the testimony that is sought."23 Out-
weighing that admittedly valid concern, however, was "the fundamental duty of a
public court in our society to do justice."24 Judge Brazil also acknowledged an
interest in reassuring "the community and the court about the integrity of the me-
diation process that the court sponsored., 25 After painstakingly weighing the rela-
tive harms in the Olam litigation, the court ordered the mediator to testify.26
About a year later, the California Supreme Court used a case involving sanc-
tions to declare that implied or judicially created exceptions to mediation confi-
dentiality are invalid. In Foxgate Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Bramalea Cal. Inc.,
the trial court appointed a retired judge as both a special master for discovery and
as a mediator.28 The order of appointment empowered the special master/mediator
15. Id. at 1129.
16. Id. at 1129 n. 23.
17. Id. at 1129.
18. Id. at 1130-33.
19. Id. at 1136.
20. Id. at 1118.
21. Id. at 1134.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1136.
25. Id. at 1137.
26. Id. at 1139.
27. Foxgate Homeowners Assn. v. Bramalea Cal. Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
28. ld. at 1120.
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to make orders governing the attendance of parties and their representatives at
mediation conferences.29 It also provided that all privileges applicable to media-
tion would be in effect.30 The special master/mediator scheduled the initial media-
tion sessions and instructed the parties to show up with their experts.31 At the first
mediation session, which was supposed to be a discussion among all parties' ex-
perts in the construction defect case, the defendant showed up without his experts,
essentially making the process pointless. 32 The plaintiff moved for sanctions,
based on the defendant's "bad faith" refusal to meaningfully participate in the
mediation process, claiming that such actions caused it to incur unnecessary ex-
penses in expert witness fees. 33 Foxgate's moving papers were supported by a
report from the special master/mediator to the court recommending sanctions.
34
The defendant objected to the special master/mediator's report, citing California
Evidence Code Sections 1119 and 1121 prohibiting mediator reports of the media-
tion to the court, but the trial court accepted the report of the special mas-
ter/mediator and awarded $30,578.43 in sanctions.35
On review, the California Court of Appeals upheld consideration of as much
of the special master/mediator's report as consisted of a "strictly neutral account
of the conduct and statements being reported along with such other information as
required to place the matters in context., 36 The Foxgate appellate court reasoned
that judicial construction is permitted "of an apparently unambiguous statute
where giving literal meaning to the words of the statute would lead to an absurd
result." 37 The court acknowledged the importance of confidentiality in mediation,
but emphasized that good faith participation in court-ordered mediations was
equally important, and that mediation confidentiality should not serve as a shield
to protect sanctionable conduct nor to strip the court of its power to police and
control its own processes. 3 8 In Foxgate, the California Supreme Court disagreed
with the lower court of appeals that a judicially created exception to the mandated
confidentiality was necessary to carry out legislative intent or "to avoid an absurd
result., 39 Rather, it declared:
Section 1119 prohibits any person, mediator and participants alike, from
revealing any written or oral communication made during mediation.
Section 1121 also prohibits the mediator, but not a party, from advising
the court about conduct during the mediation that might warrant sanc-
tions. It also prohibits the court from considering a report that includes






34. Id. at 1121.
35. Id. at 1122.
36. Id. at 1123.
37. Id. at 1122.
38. Id. at 1122-23.
39. Id. at 1125.
2003]
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The submission to the court, and the court's consideration of, the report
of Judge Smith violated Sections 1119 and 112 1.4°
Without citation, the court declared: ". . .the Legislature has weighed and bal-
anced the policy that promotes effective mediation by requiring confidentiality
against a policy that might better encourage good faith participation in the proc-
ess." 4' The court noted that competing policy matters, including concerns about
bad faith participation during a mediation that are otherwise sanctionable during
litigation, trial proceedings, or professional misconduct in mediation, are policy
matters for the legislature.42
According to the court, the legislative intent was in fact to ensure confidenti-
ality so that the candid discussion essential to effective mediation is promoted.43
The court's decision on one level appears obvious -- mediation confidentiality can
only be breached where expressly permitted by statute.1 n Yet, the court acknowl-
edged that such absolute protection must yield to "supervening" rights such as the
constitutional due-process based exception recognized in Rinaker v. Superior
Court.45
It is important to note that the Foxgate decision distinguished Olam on the
grounds that in Olam both parties had waived their mediation confidentiality
privilege. The distinction is illusory because the California statute (and the UMA)
empowers the mediator with an independent right to assert his mediator privilege.
Thus, after Foxgate, the law in California is a strict mediation confidentiality stat-
ute with the Supreme Court of California forbidding judicially created exceptions.
Since there is no statutory exception to mediation confidentiality for proceedings
to enforce a mediated agreement, courts are left to resolve enforcement questions
without piercing mediation confidentiality.
IV. STRICT MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY CREATES ABSURD
ENFORCEMENT RESULTS
Many mediators view the strict confidentiality approach as necessary to pro-
tect the mediation process.46 Mediation confidentiality's interference with en-
forcement proceedings will be relatively rare because parties to a settlement
agreement almost always voluntarily satisfy the terms of the settlement agree-
ment.47 While statistically infrequent, judicial involvement in a proceeding to
enforce a mediated agreement often reveals legitimate and complicated concerns
about the practice of mediation that sometimes question the integrity of the proc-
ess. Requiring strict confidentiality in those infrequent instances when a party
40. Id. at 1125-26.
41. Id. at 1128.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1126.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1127.
46. See id. at 1126 n. 12 (noting that every mediation association in California that filed an amicus
brief encouraged the court to maintain confidentiality).
47. See Olam., 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
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requests court intervention through an enforcement proceeding severely handicaps
the courts as they address some of the most profound concerns about mediation.
A. Issues Raised in Proceedings to Enforce Mediated Agreements
Consider the allegations that have confronted courts across the country in
proceedings to enforce or avoid mediated agreements:
Whether an agreement was reached:
* after reaching an oral agreement in a mediation, one 4arty later
adds additional terms to the written settlement agreement;
*after reaching a written mediated agreement that provides for a fu-
ture "full and complete release, mutually agreeable to both parties,"
one party includes a clause or term in the release that was not dis-
cussed at the mediation;
49
* after reaching a mediated settlement agreement that mutually re-
leased the parties from all claims, the defendant submitted a general
release that contained new terms;
50
* after agreeing to the general terms of a one-page mediated agree-
ment, the retired judge mediator later expanded the agreement to a
thirty-three page order;51
* the parties entered an agreement in principle or bare bones agree-
ment that did not address all issues;
52
*one party maintained that the mediated settlement agreement was
only an agreement to agree and not intended to be a final and bind-
ing settlement;
53
* the parties agreed to a schedule of payments that would be secured
by a promissory note, but later could not agree on the promissory
note's rate of interest;
54
48. Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 804, 806-07 (W. Va. 2002).
49. Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001).
50. Jaynes v. Austin, 2001 WL 1176424 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2001).
51. Weddington Prod., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 267-68 (1998).
52. Stempel v. Stempel, 633 S.2d 26 (Fla. Dist. App. 1994); Thermos Co. v. Starbucks Corp., 1998
WL 299469 at *2 (N.D. 111. May 29, 1998). See also Bartos v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, 1990 WL
32385 at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 27, 1990).
53. Walk Haydel & Assoc. Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 720 S.2d 372, 373 (La. App. 1998);
Coulter v. Carewell Corp., 21 P.3d 1078, 1081 n.2, (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
54. Montanaro v. Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. App. 1997).
20031
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*the parties reached an agreement regarding a disputed boundary,
but disagreed whether this resolution included the placement of a
fence;55
othe parties disagreed about whether an agreement consisting of two
pages scribbled by the mediator and signed by both parties and their
attorneys was an enforceable agreement or merely a summary of
terms for further discussion;
56




*a party injured in an auto accident was led to believe that the policy
limit was $100,000 when it was actually $1.25 million; 58
*a party asserts that the final draft of a complex settlement agree-
ment removed the conveyance of mineral rights that were previously
agreed to; 59
*a party's counsel made misrepresentations regarding whether a key
witness would testify if the case were to proceed to trial;
6 0
*a party was lied to by her own attorney, the mediator, and a third
party;
61
*a party relied on misrepresentations by her union that she was only
entitled to six months back-pay when she may have been entitled to
eighteen months of back pay;
62
*a wife asserted that her husband had misrepresented his financial
information during a divorce proceeding;
63
ea party maintains that the mediator wrongly informed them that
they should settle because any award they would receive would go
directly to pay the creditors listed in his bankruptcy;
64
55. Howard v. Ramsey, 2001 WL 228015 at *1 (Ohio App. Mar. 9, 2001).
56. Sunburst Estates 11 Homeowners Assn v. Sunburst Estates I Homeowners Assn., 2001 WL
1515815 at *4 (Cal. App. Nov. 29, 2001).
57. Moore v. Lieberman, 2001 WL 490777 at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 23, 2001).
58. Brinkerhoff v. Campbell, 994 P.2d 911,913 (Wash. App. 2000).
59. Brown v. Brown, 2002 WL 1343222 at *2 (Tex. App. June 21, 2002).
60. Graf v. Sholes, 1998 WL 297519 at *I (Minn. App. June 9, 1998).
61. Vela v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 966 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
62. Palmer v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 2002 WL 1288701 at *2 (10th Cir. June 12, 2002).
63. Crupi v. Crupi, 784 S.2d 611,614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398, 404-
05 (Tex. App. 2002).
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/8
Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't be all Wrong
*a party in a construction defect case asserted that they were told
that the settlement agreement would be binding upon the sub-
contractors;
65
*one party averred that the opposition presented appraisers with
false information;
66
Conditions Precedent to Binding Agreement:
*the final term of a mediated settlement agreement stated it was
"subject to execution of a formal agreement consistent with the
terms herein";
67
ea mediated agreement provided that counsel "will draft more for-
mal settlement documents for review and approval by the other
counsel";
68
*a mechanic's report, which was a condition precedent to the par-
ties' mediated agreement, was contested;
69
*one party alleges an implied condition precedent that an accounting
firm would correctly apply an agreed upon net-loss formula;
70
*a party delayed making a payment specified in the mediated
agreement because it considered the court's execution of a stipula-








*a scrivener's error in a mediated agreement led to a $600,000 wind-
fall for one party;
73
64. Chitkara v. New York Tel. Co., 2002 WL 31004729 at *1 (2nd Cir. Sept. 6, 2002).
65. Vick v. Waits, 2002 WL 1163842 at *1-2 (Tex. App. June 4, 2002).
66. Cox v. Hicks, 2001 WL 881356 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2001).
67. Golding v. Floyd, 539 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Va. 2001).
68. Lerer v. Lerer, 2002 WL 31656109 at *3 (Tex. App. Nov. 26, 2002).
69. Forysiak v. Laird Marine & Mfg., 2001 WL 1256402 at *2 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Oct. 19, 2001).
70. Tarrant Distrib. Inc. v. Heublein Inc., 127 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1997).
71. Clayton v. Henry, 1999 WL 89945 *1 (Tex. App. Feb. 24, 1999).
72. In re Hudgins, 188 B.R. 938, 942 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
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oboth parties were mistaken as to the cash value of insurance poli-
cies used as consideration in a mediated agreement.74
*one party alleged that there was a mistake regarding whether to
credit a pre-mediation payment of $40,000 toward the $75,000
agreed to at the mediation;
75
*a party settled a contested claim to participate in an ESOP for
$150,000, but a subsequent IRS determination established his right
to participate and receive $900,000;76
Duress:
*a governmental agency made repeated threats of criminal prosecu-
tion unless the civil case was immediately settled in the mediation;
77
ea mediator threatened to inform the trial judge that the failure to
reach agreement was one party's fault and that this party would not
get custody of frozen embryos;
78
*the mediator would not allow a party to leave the mediation with-
out an agreement although he was complaining of chest pains and
had a history of heart problems;
79
'a party claimed that their own attorney coerced them into signing
their settlement agreement;
80
'a party maintained that the only reason they signed the agreement
was because the other party applied economic duress upon them;
8I
'a party asserted that the mediator as well as the opposing party and
their counsel pressured her to sign the settlement agreement while
she was in the middle of a family health emergency;
82
'a party imparted that she only signed the agreement so she could go
home after attending a fourteen hour mediation held on the day of
74. Cain v. Saunders, 813 S.2d 891, 893 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).
75. Feldman v. Kritch, 824 S.2d 274, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
76. Liquidation of Prof. Med. Ins. Co. v. Lakin, 88 S.W.3d 471,475 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).
77. F.D.I.C. v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 737 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
78. Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 S.2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
79. Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., 1996 WL 447954 at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 1996).
80. Lype v. Watkins, 1998 WL 734429 at *1 (Tex. App. Oct. 22, 1998).
81. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Custom Blending Intl. Inc., 1998 WL 842289 at *1-2 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 24, 1998).
82. McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 S.2d 806, 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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her first husband's funeral where her car was seriously damaged
when it was hit during the course of the mediation;
8 3
*party claimed that she was left almost completely alone for the en-
tirety of a fifteen hour mediation session, was in a weakened physi-
cal and emotional state, and was in great physical pain. 84
Agreements Against Public Policy:
*the mediation process violated the due process rights of a mother
waiving her parental rights;
85
*a plaintiff with ADEA claims unknowingly and involuntarily
waived her rights in a mediated agreement;
86
*the parties agreed to perform an illegal act in the mediated agree-
ment.
87
Ambiguity of the Terms of the Agreement:
*an issue of whether a mediated agreement entitled a party to half of
stock options realized by her husband after the mediated agreement
was signed but before entry of judgment;88
ea question of whether a settlement agreement in a workers' com-
pensation case also settled discrimination and wrongful termination
claims; 89
*a dispute whether a specified payment was strictly limited for edu-
cational purposes for an MBA at William and Mary;
90
*a dispute whether an agreement to pay wife's credit cards was lim-
ited to the two disclosed at the mediation or should be extended to
the seven she had;
91
ethe parties disagreed over whether their performance was to be de-
livery of $68,500.80 worth of machinery parts or to give a 30% dis-
83. Berg v. Bregman, 2002 WL 31256677, *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002).
84. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
85. In re T.D., 28 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
86. Jacobs v. N.Y. Fin. Ctr. Hotel, 1997 WL 375737 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1997).
87. In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex. App. 1999).
88. Ansley v. Ansley, 2002 WL 1991193 at *1-2 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2002).
89. Grimes v. Andrews, 997 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Tex. App. 1999).
90. Baker v. Baker, 1999 WL 1318855 at *1-2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 1999).
91. Exparte Littlepage, 796 S.2d 298, 299 (Ala. 2001).
2003]
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count on future orders of machinery parts for a total discount of
$68,500.80;92
eparties disagreed over the meaning of the phrase: "discount for pre-
sent value."0
3
Strict mediation confidentiality's absurd enforcement results are demon-
strated by contrasting how the above cases would be approached in two instances:
the first is an unfettered application of contract law; the second is if the contested
agreement had been created with the assistance of a mediator in a jurisdiction with
strict confidentiality like California.
B. The Enforcement of Settlement Agreements is Normally Governed by
the Law of Contracts
In the absence of mediation confidentiality, the law of contracts governs set-
tlement agreements. 94 The law of contracts consists of the collection of require-
ments that define when a commitment rises to the level of triggering legal en-
forceability. 95 Needless to say, the volumes of cases and treatises regarding the
law of contracts cannot be summarized here. However, it should be noted that
such sources reflect centuries of experience in defining and articulating fairness
and justice in the administration and enforcement of agreements. 96 For the pur-
poses of this article, suffice it to liberally paraphrase "the Teacher" in saying,
"There are few new contract issues under the sun." 97 Specifically, many of the
scenarios described above could benefit from the "rules of law" that developed out
of preceding cases with similar facts. 98
A simple examination of the "Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Second
Edition" reveals that the laws of contract culminate in standards defining the con-
ditions necessary for, among other things:
e the formation of a binding agreement (including capacity, offer, ac-
ceptance, and consideration);
* the voiding of an otherwise binding agreement (including mistake,
misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence); 0o
92. Cleveland Trencher Co., Inc. v. Transtexas Transmission Co., 2002 WL 31272366 at *1 (Tex.
App. Sept. 30, 2002).
93. Lau Family Partn. Ltd. v. Nirtag U.S., Inc., 2002 WL 997741 at *1 (Tex. App. May 16, 2002).
94. Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 738 (Wyo. 2001); McEnany v. W. Del. County Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523, 534 (N.D. Iowa 1994); Coulter, 21 P.3d at 1082; Feldman, 824 S.2d at 277.
95. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 3 (2002).
96. See Ronald C. Griffin, Contracting in the Americas: Part 1, 34 Washburn L.J. 232, 234-36
(Spring 1995).
97. See Ecclesiastes 1:9 (stating "[T]here is no new thing under the sun.") (King James).
98. See Deason, supra n. 1, at 38 (observing that, "[t]o the extent contract principles embody soci-
ety's view of appropriate consent, applying them to avoid unjust enforcement of agreements can be
crucial to maintaining party autonomy and keeping informed consent at the heart of mediation").
99. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 9-94 (1981).
100. See id. §§ 151-177.
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* declaring an otherwise binding agreement unenforceable on the
grounds of public policy (promises in restraint of trade or marriage;
promises involving the commission of a tort or violation of a fiduciary
duty; term exempting from liability harm caused intentionally, recklessly,
or negligently; term exempting from consequences of misrepresentation;
or unconscionability);' 0 1
e the meanings of the terms of a binding agreement (interpretation,
supplying an omitted essential term, the effect of a written agreement/the
parol evidence rule, course of dealing and customary practice, and con-
struing conditions in agreements);'1 2
* the effect of performance and non-performance (effect on other
party's duties of a failure to render or offer performance, partial perform-
ance or breach, and circumstances significant in determining whether a
failure is material); 103
* impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose (death or
incapacity of person necessary for performance, prevention by govern-
mental regulation or order, partial and temporary impracticability);'1 4 and
* assignment and delegation.10 5
For agreements created in the absence of a mediator, the above cases
identifying issues affecting the enforcement of mediated agreements
would be resolved by applying the pertinent doctrines of contract law to
each alleged scenario.
1. Contract Law Relies on the Totality of the Circumstances to Resolve
Issue Arising Out of Agreements
Standard contract law for assessing the enforceability of an agreement often
requires a review of circumstances occurring during contract formation. A court's
view should be broad enough to consider "all of the relevant circumstances of the
transaction."'06 Under this broad approach, a reviewing court seeks to ascertain
the parties' intentions and give effect to the contract. 1°7 The broad approach is
favored because it tends to show what was in the minds of the parties in light of
all the surrounding circumstances. 0 8 As Professor Wigmore so aptly put it, "Hav-
ing themselves locked up the idea in the words, they must furnish the key to
101. See id. §§ 178-199.
102. See id. §§ 200-230.
103. See id. §§ 231-260.
104. See id. §§ 261-272.
105. See id. §§ 316-343.
106. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 4.12 at 630-31 (Joseph M Perillo ed., rev. ed., West
1993).
107. Id.
108. Id. See also Weston v. Ball, 116 A. 99, 100 (N.H. 1922).
20031
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unlock it."' 9 The key is found in all of the circumstances that surround the con-
tractual agreement. "10
The "totality of the circumstances" standard is as broad as it sounds: courts
have looked well beyond information within the four comers of a settlement
document, examining factors regarding the parties and their representatives, the
attitude of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances of the negotiations lead-
ing up to the settlement."' In the context of a settlement agreement that purports
to waive or release federally-based claims, for example, courts have construed the
"totality of the circumstances" surrounding the settlement to include an array of
factors consisting not only of the individual party's education and business ex-
perience, the clarity of the agreement, and presence of counsel, but also aspects
that could only be adduced by looking to the negotiation process itself." 2 This
includes the party's "input in negotiating the terms of the settlement, the amount
of time . . . for deliberation before signing, whether the party actually read the
release and considered its terms before signing it, and whether the release was
induced by improper conduct on the defendant's part."'"3 In applying these fac-
tors, a court reviewing the settlement of an employee's disability discrimination
claims looked to the employee's "level of input into the settlement," the number
of hours he had to deliberate on the proposed settlement, and the "pace" and struc-
ture of the settlement meeting, as well as how others involved in the settlement
conference behaved toward him in weighing the "totality of the circumstances."
' 14
Totality of the circumstances specifically includes "evidence of prior or con-
temporaneous agreements and negotiation."'5
109. John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law vol. 9, § 2465, 223 (James H. Chad-
bourn ed., rev. ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1981).
110. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1981).
111. Cornell v. Delco Electronics Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120-21 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing with approval, Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., Co. 65 F.3d 562, 571
(7th Cir. 1995). See also Bormann v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2nd Cir.
1989); Torrez v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, Inc., 908 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1990).
114. Cornell, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
115. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 (1981):
Evidence of Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements and Negotiations:
Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing
are admissible in evidence to establish
(a) that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement;
(b) that the integrated agreement, if any, is completely or partially
integrated;
(c) the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated;
(d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration or
other invalidating cause;
(e) ground for granting or denying rescission, reformation, specific performance, or other
remedy.
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2. Resolving Mediated Agreement Enforcement Issues by an Unfettered
Application of Contract Law
a. Cases Questioning Whether there was a Definite Agreement on all
Essential Terms
Contract law requires a "definiteness of essential terms" for an agreement to
be considered enforceable. Professor Williston summarizes this requirement as
follows:
It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding,
must be sufficiently definite to enable courts to give it an exact mean-
ing. 1 6 In particular ... a provision that some matter shall be settled by
future agreement has often caused a promise to be too indefinite for en-
forcement. The Restatement suggests as an illustration of this a building
contract which is definite in all particulars except for a provision that the
form of window fastening shall be afterwards agreed upon .... This
would not make the entire building contract unenforceable; by contrast, if
the nature of the window fastenings were fixed by the agreement while
the dimensions of the building were left to future agreement, there would
be no enforceable obligation. Obviously, the question is one of de-
gree. 117
Simply, as one court has stated it, "[A] meeting of the minds of the parties is
a sine qua non of all contracts."" 8 The more modem view reflected in the UCC
and Restatement (Second) of Contracts is to ". . .ask essentially two questions:
first, did the parties intend to contract, and second, is there a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy." '" 9
Courts have often applied this principle of contract law to resolve whether
mediated agreements should be enforced. Whether to enforce the mediated agree-
ment hinges on the degree of essentialness of the alleged indefinite term. Thus,
the above cases involving whether there was an agreement on all essential terms
would be resolved by determining whether the disputed term was essential enough
to constitute a failure to agree on an essential term. 20 If the disputed terms were
116. 1 Williston on Contracts § 4:18, 414-20 (4th ed. 1990).
117. Id. at § 4:28,602-05 (quoted in Weddington, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 278).
118. Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 809 (quoting Wheeling Downs Racing Ass'n v. West Virginia Sportservice,
Inc., 157 W. Va. 93, 199 S.E.2d 308 (1973) (quoting Martin v. Ewing, 112 W. Va. 332, 164 S.E. 859
(1932)).
119. See Williston § 4:18, at 425.
120. See Chappell, 548 S.E.2d 499 (refusing to enforce entire settlement agreement when a portion of
agreement does not constitute "a meeting of the minds"); Riner, 563 S.E.2d 804 (finding no valid
agreement when one party subsequently added terms that were not discussed during the mediation
which released them from all current and future claims and assigned future expenses related to the
performance of the settlement agreement to the opposing party); DeGarmo v. DeGarno, 499 S.E.2d
317 (Ga. 1998) (where the Georgia Supreme Court split with three justices dissenting over the issue of
whether a mediated agreement that specified certain issues for resolution in the future resolved all
essential terms); Weddington, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (reversing enforcement of mediation agreement
after finding a lack of agreement to the essential terms of a licensing agreement, the essence of the
2003J
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terms were determined to be essential, the mediated agreement would not be en-
forced for failure to reach a comprehensive agreement. 12 1 If the additional dis-
puted terms were determined to be ministerial or non-essential, the mediated
agreement would be enforced. 122  Mediated agreements have also been voided
when essential terms have been found to be ambiguous and beyond interpreta-
tion.1
21
b. Cases Questioning Whether a Mediated Agreement was Accomplished
by Duress or Coercion
Contract law recognizes that sometimes one party forces the other party to
agree to the terms of a contract. This is remotely related to a lack of a meeting of
minds of the parties. If one party forces the other to terms with which they do not
agree, there is no meeting of minds, only the force of one mind dominating the
written instrument.124 Essentially there is a lack of agreement. Duress and coer-
cion can be evidenced by pressure placed on one party via threats of legal or bod-
ily harm.' 25 Basically, duress is "... . any wrongful act or threat which overcomes
the free will of a party."'' 26 Duress is evidenced by a restraint, intimidation, or
compulsion to such an extent as to induce another person to commit an act which
they are not legally bound to commit and contrary to their will.
127
Some jurisdictions apply an objective standard requiring the alleged coercive
event to be of such severity, either threatened, impending, or actually inflicted, so
parties' conflict); Thermos, 1998 WL 299469 (determining that the main issue regarding the redesign
of the coffee tumbler was never settled, thus, the oral mediated agreement was not binding); Schwartz
v. Adamson, 1999 WL 170676 (Minn. App. Mar. 30, 1999) (refusing to enforce a settlement agreement
because there was a lack of agreement as to whether windows in the plaintiff's home would need to be
replaced); Walk Haydel, 720 S.2d 372 (enforcing a handwritten settlement agreement that contained
figures and conditions precedent and releases but did not resolve all the issues between the parties);
Sunburst Estates 1I, 2001 WL 1515815 (finding a mediated agreement executed and signed by parties
and counsel unenforceable and lacking mutual assent on the basis that, among other things, one side
viewed the document "as merely setting forth terms for further discussion" and "did not intend to be
bound by the mediator's notes."); Stempel, 633 S.2d 26 (affirming a judgment that added "ministerial"
terms to a bare bones mediated agreement); Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d 428 (finding agreement on all
essential terms in a mediated agreement despite the inability to agree on the terms of an acceleration
clause and rate of interest in a promissory note that served as security for specified payments); Moore,
2001 WL 490777 (finding that a failure to agree on the tax structure of a settlement constituted a
failure to agree on all essential terms).
121. See Weddington, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265; Chappell, 548 S.E.2d 499; Riner, 563 S.E.2d 804; Ther-
mos, 1998 WL 299469; Schwartz, 1999 WL 170676; Sunburst Estates II, 2001 WL 1515815; Moore,
2001 WL 490777.
122. See Walk Haydel & Assoc., 720 S.2d 372; Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d 428.
123. In re U. S. Brass Corp., 277 B.R. 326 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (describing where a mediated agreement
never defined the term "unit" but provided that payment for each "unit" would be $940, and was de-
clared unenforceable because of vagueness); F&K Supply, Inc. v. Willowbrook Development Co., 732
N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding that a mediated agreement which only vaguely alluded
to "certain claims" and did not clarify which members of the group of multiple defendants were repre-
sented by and bound by the agreement was impenetrably vague and uncertain and, thus, unenforce-
able).
124. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 9.2 (4th ed. 1998).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. McClellan v. McClellan, 873 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tenn. App. 1993).
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as to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness. 12 However,
the overwhelming weight of authority treats duress as a subjective test. Thus, the
operative inquiry is whether the person has been overcome in such a manner as to
cause them to operate in a manner contrary to their free will. 129 If answered in the
affirmative, the contract may be voided for duress. For either the subjective or the
objective test, the court must examine the words and actions of the parties in-
volved. The courts may well inquire whether the complaining party vocalized
their concerns at the time of contract formation.'
1 30
Courts have often applied this principle of contract law to resolve whether
mediated agreements should be enforced. The enforceability of the mediated
agreement has depended upon the type and degree of pressure exerted, and the
effect it had on the other party.' 3' Some courts have specified that the "duress"
must emanate from one who is a party to the contract. 132 Thus, courts have exam-
ined the words and actions of the parties and mediator in creating the mediated
agreement and determined whether one party's assent to the agreement was con-
trary to his free will. In most cases, the allegation of duress was rebuffed and the
mediated agreement enforced. 133 There are cases where the mediated agreement
was not enforced because of duress. 34
128. Id.
129. Calamari & Perillo, supra n. 124, at § 9.2.
130. In re Marriage of Baltins, 260 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1989).
131. See Palmer 2002 WL 1288701 (although plaintiff felt pressure to accept the settlement, the
evidence did not show the type of duress needed to avoid the contract); Olam., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110
(sixty-five-year old female party to mediated agreement asserted that her assent was the product of
undue influence because she was susceptible to pressure due to emotional and physical distress; she
was completely exhausted at the end of a fifteen hour mediation during which she was left alone al-
most the entire time, was not spoken to, and in great physical pain); Randle, 996 WL 447954 (appellate
court overturned summary judgment enforcing the mediated agreement upon finding possible duress
where a party to a mediation was placed in grave danger that was not warranted under the circum-
stances; the party had a history of heart trouble, had not taken his medication that day and was begin-
ning to experience chest pains; when he informed the mediator of his need to leave and why, he was
told that he could not leave until a settlement was reached.); Vitakis-Valchine, 793 S.2d 1094 (court
remanded case to determine if mediator engaged in misconduct by threatening a divorcing party that he
would tell the judge that it was her fault that a settlement agreement was not reached and that she
would never get custody of frozen embryos and that the parties had five minutes and then had to "get
out of here"); F.D.I.C., 76 F. Supp. 2d 736 (court found no duress despite assertions of potential crimi-
nal charges being filed against a party if they did not settle a civil case in the mediation); Berg, 2002
WL 31256677 (party to mediation settlement agreement claimed that the signed agreement was a
product of undue influence because: the mediation took fourteen hours; she was incapacitated by
medications, fatigue and the fact that the mediation was taking place on the same day as her ex-
husband's funeral, her car was struck and sustained substantial damage during the mediation; and that
she was influenced to sign by her attorney; the court found that because she did not complain nor
outwardly display any signs of incapacity her agreement was absent undue influence); Goodman v.
Hokom, 2001 WL 1531187 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Dec. 4, 2001) (party to mediation settlement agreement
later asserts claim of duress; court finds claim is unfounded); Custom Blending Int'l., Inc., 1998 WL
842289 (in which a court rejected a theory of duress because the other side threatened protracted and
expensive litigation already pending); Crupi, 784 S.2d 611 (where a claim of coercion on the grounds
of taking Xanax and feeling pressure to settle was denied).
132. Vitakis-Valchine, 793 S.2d 1094; Lype v. Watkins, 1998 WL 734429 (Tex. App. Oct. 22, 1998);
In re Marriage of Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App. 1994).
133. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110; F.D.I.C., 76 F. Supp. 2d 736; Berg, 2002 WL 31256677; Cus-
tom Blending Int'l. Inc., 1998 WL 842289; Crupi, 784 So. 2d 611.
134. See Randle, 1996 WL 447954; Vitakis-Valchine, 793 S.2d 1094.
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c. Cases Questioning Whether an Agreement should be Voided because of
Mistake
A mutual mistake occurs when both parties to an agreement believe and rely
on information or an assumption that, while they believe it to be true, is actually
false.' 35 If the mistake results in an exchange of values that is deeply iniquitous,
then the contract can be voided unless the risk of such a mistake was allocated as
part of the terms of the contract.1 36 A court will dissolve a contract for mutual
mistake but rarely for a unilateral mistake. 137 This is usually because the party
with a unilateral mistake entered the contract with limited knowledge that he
thought to be sufficient to consummate the deal. 38 When a party enters a deal
relying on his later discovered insufficient knowledge that party will not be let out
of the deal unless the other party knew or had reason to know that the party with
the limited knowledge was relying on such knowledge and that it was insuffi-
cient.139 An example of a mutual mistake is when both parties believe a fact to be
true and it is not. For a court to find a mutual mistake that voids a contract, it
would determine that neither party could possibly know the meaning attached by
the other party. If and when this type of case arises, there is no meeting of the
minds; hence, there never was a contract.
40
135. Mistake Defined: A mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra n. 115, § 15 1:
When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract Voidable
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of per-
formances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk
of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152.
136. Calamari & Perillo, supra n. 124, § 9.26.
137. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153.
When Mistake of One Party Makes a Contract Voidable.
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on
which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances
that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the mis-
take under the rule stated in § 154, and
(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscion-
able, or
(b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.
Id.
138. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154.
When a Party Bears the Risk of a Mistake
A party bears the risk of a mistake when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with re-
spect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient,
or (c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable in the cir-
cumstances to do so.
Id.
139. Id.
140. See e.g. Beck v. Reynolds, 903 P.2d 317 (Okla. 1995) (court refused to enforce a settlement
agreement where both parties negotiated based on the mistaken belief that the defendant's insurance
coverage totaled $200,000 when it actually totaled $1.1 million).
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Courts have applied this concept of contract law to resolve whether mediated
agreements should be enforced.141 The enforceability depends upon whether both
parties rely on mistaken information, and whether one of the parties knew or
should have known the meaning attached to a material term by the other. Courts
have refused to enforce mediated agreements due to mutual mistake 42 and en-
forced the mediated agreements because any mistake was merely unilateral. 143
d. Cases Questioning the Enforceability of an Agreement because of
Fraud
Contract law voids agreements that are the result of fraud. Fraud requires a
false representation that is known or should have been known to be false by the
representing party, with the intent to deceive the other party into making a con-
tract. 14 It is crucial for the defrauded party to show deception and reliance in
proving the fraud. 145 The defrauded party must show that they believed the false-
hood and relied on the falsehood in forming the contract. 146 Further, where a duty
of disclosure exists, non-disclosure (as opposed to affirmative misrepresentation)
can be treated as grounds to invalidate a contract.147 Therefore, misrepresentation
or concealment may be grounds to invalidate a contract.
Courts have applied this contract law principle to determine whether to en-
force mediated agreements. 48 The enforceability depends on whether the state-
141. DR Lakes Inc., 819 S.2d. 971 (court refused to enforce a mediated settlement agreement when a
scrivener's error led to a $600,000 windfall to the plaintiff); Feldman, 824 S.2d 274 (plaintiffs sued
insurance company on uninsured motorist claim and were paid $40,000 as a pre-mediation payment;
after entering a mediated settlement agreement to settle the case for $75,000, the insurance company
wanted to rescind the agreement because it claimed that both parties made the mistake of not including
the pre-mediation payment as a partial payment of the $75,000; the court enforced the settlement
agreement as it was written; it found through the testimony of the mediator that there was no mutual
mistake as no other figures were discussed except the $75,000 and that if there was a mistake it was
unilateral and on the part of the insurance company); Liquidation of Prof. Med. Ins. Co., 2002 WL
1396084 (court denied request to rescind mediated settlement agreement because the alleged mistake
was, among other things, regarding a future contingent legal right and not a question of fact). But see
Cain, 813 S.2d 891, cert. denied, (in which an Alabama appellate court split 3-2 in support of a trial
court that refused to accept testimony regarding an alleged mutual mistake in the making of a mediated
settlement agreement).
142. See DR Lakes Inc., 819 S.2d. 971.
143. See Feldman, 824 S.2d 274.
144. Calamari & Perillo, supra n. 124, § 9.14. See e.g. Harriman v. Maddocks, 518 A.2d 1027 (Me.
1996) (court found sufficient evidence to overturn summary judgment where plaintiff alleged that they
were fraudulently induced to sign a complete release form when they were led to believe that it applied
only to vehicle damage).
145. Calamari & Perillo, supra n. 124, § 9.15.
146. Id. (citing with approval Eslamizar v. American States Ins. Co., 894 P.2d 1195 (Or. App. 1995)).
147. See id. at §§ 9.13, 9.20. See also Avary v. Bank of Am., 72 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App. 2002).
148. See Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398 (affirming trial court's ruling that divorce settlement was unenforce-
able because husband failed to disclose a $230,000 bonus as part of their marital property); Graf, 1998
WL 297519 (overturning trial court finding of fraud where one party to a mediation was told by her
attorney during the course of the mediation that one of their material witnesses would not testify if they
proceeded to trial; party later found out that the statement was false and sought to void the mediated
settlement agreement); Palmer, 2002 WL 1288701 (finding that "[a]s a general rule, actionable fraud
cannot consist of unfulfilled predictions or erroneous conjectures as to future events. .. . Merely
expressing an opinion in the nature of a prophecy as to the happening of a future event is not action-
able."); Crupi, 784 S.2d 611 (upholding a mediated divorce settlement despite allegations by the ex-
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ments were sufficiently false, 149 whether they were knowingly false, 50 and
whether the reliance is justified.'15  Courts have found cases where sufficient evi-
dence of potential fraud in mediation negotiations has been present, 52 and ab-
sent. 153
e. Cases Questioning the Enforceability of an Agreement as Contrary to
Public Policy
Contract law refuses to enforce some agreements contrary to public policy,
which means generally they are agreements that society has decided not to con-
done. 154  These are sometimes called illegal or unconscionable contracts. For
example, in most states, it is illegal to contract for sexual relations. There are
essentially "two kinds of agreements that violate public policy: first, those that
obviously tend to injure public morals, public health, or confidence in the admini-
stration of law; and second, those that destroy the security of individuals' rights to
personal safety or private property."'
' 55
Courts have applied this concept of contract law to resolve whether to enforce
a mediated agreement. 56 When deciding whether to enforce the mediated agree-
wife that her ex-husband had fraudulently misrepresented his financial information during the media-
tion); Avary, 72 S.W.3d 779 (determining that there was sufficient evidence of a fraudulently induced
settlement agreement to defeat summary judgment and remand for discovery regarding this and other
related issues); Brinkerhoff, 994 P.2d 911 (reversing trial court's order of enforcement and remanding
so that an evidentiary hearing may be conducted to determine if misrepresentations were made in a
mediation); Gelfand v. Gabriel, 2002 WL 1397037 at *4 (Cal. App. June 27, 2002) (trial and appellate
courts found that the discovery of "facts subsequent to the settlement that would have disputed plain-
tiff's claim does not render plaintiff's representations made at the time of the mediation fraudulent,"
proof must be offered to show that the plaintiff knew the representation was false and then justifiably
reliance on that representation).
149. See Crupi, 784 S.2d at 613.
150. See Palmer, 2002 WL 1288701.
151. The Second Circuit wrote:
The nature of mediation is such that a mediator's statement regarding the predicted litiga-
tion value of a claim, where that prediction is based on a fact that can be readily verified (in
this case, that the Title VII claim proceeds will go to creditors in plaintiff's pending bank-
ruptcy), cannot be relied on by a counseled litigant whose counsel is present at the time the
statement is made.
Chitkara, 2002 WL 31004729 at *2.
152. See Avary, 72 S.W.3d 779; Brinkerhoff, 994 P.2d 911; Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398.
153. See Graf, 1998 WL 297519; Crupi, 784 S.2d 611; Palmer, 2002 WL 1288701; Gelfand, 2002
WL 1397037 at *4.
154. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 179.
Bases of Public Policies Against Enforcement
A public policy against the enforcement of promises or other terms may be derived by the
court from
(a) legislation relevant to such a policy, or
(b) the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare, as is the case for the judicial poli-
cies
against, for example,
(i) restraint of trade (§§ 186-188),
(ii) impairment of family relations (§§ 189-191), and
(iii) interference with other protected interests (§§ 192-196, 356).
155. Schmidt v. U.S., 912 P.2d 871, 875 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
156. See In re T.D., 28 P.3d 1163 (applying strict judicial scrutiny to a mediated agreement that
waived parental rights and found the agreement unenforceable as against public policy because due
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ment, the court looked to whether the agreement could be performed without vio-
lating the law, the agreement accomplishes an end that is contrary to the public
good like releasing a parent from all accrued and future child support obligations,
or whether a party surrendering important rights was acting voluntarily and with
intelligent comprehension of their actions. 157
f. Cases Involving Conditions Precedent to Contracts
A condition precedent is any event that the parties agree must happen before
the contract becomes binding.158 For example, if Party A tells Party B that "if
you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge at 6 p.m. tomorrow, I will wash your car for
$50." The condition preceding any duty on the part of Party A to wash B's car is
if B walks across the Brooklyn Bridge at 6 p.m. the next day. If B does not, then
the offer to wash B's car is null and void.
Courts have been called on to determine if mediated agreements contained
explicit condition precedents and if those conditions had been satisfied, 159 as well
as allegations of implied conditions precedent.16° Courts have looked to whether




g. Cases Involving Ambiguous Contract Terms
Contract law determines how to deal with an allegation that a contract term is
ambiguous. Courts will examine the agreement and determine if its words or
phrases are ambiguous as a matter of law.' 62 In making this determination the
court should first give the words "a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning." 63
If the parties are from a specialized field such as insurance or science, then any
term of art from that industry should be given its general meaning within that
industry.' 64 If all of the words, as presented, point to a singular reasonable mean-
process rights were not protected); In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d 305 (refusing to enforce a mediated
agreement because it provided for the destruction of evidence of illegal tape recordings of telephone
conversations).
157. In re T.D., 28 P.3d 1163.
158. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224: "Condition Defined: A condition is an event, not
certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a
contract becomes due."
159. See Golding, 539 S.E.2d 735 (noting where a clause in a mediated agreement specifying that the
agreement was "subject to the execution of a formal agreement" was deemed to create a condition
precedent); Lerer, 2002 WL 31656109 (where a provision in the mediated agreement providing that
counsel "will draft more formal settlement documents" was deemed not to be a condition precedent);
Forsyiak, 2001 WL 1256402 (describing where an expert's report was deemed a condition precedent
to the mediated agreement; once the expert "determined that the engines were operable, then the case
was settled"); Clayton, 1999 WL 88945 (rejecting a party's claim that the court's execution of a stipu-
lated judgment was a condition precedent to its performance under the mediated agreement).
160. Tarrant Dist., Inc., 127 F.3d 375 (refusing to imply that an accounting firm's correct application
of a net loss formula was a condition precedent to a binding mediated agreement).
161. See Golding, 539 S.E.2d 735.
162. Lamb Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Kraus-Anderson of Minneapolis, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 859, 862
(Minn. 1980).
163. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a).
164. See id. § 202(3)(b).
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ing, the court will declare that the contract is not ambiguous and end its interpreta-
tion analysis there. Thus, if the contract is unambiguous and fully integrated, the
parol evidence rule requires the contract to be interpreted and administered ac-
cording to the terms in the four comers of the agreement.165
In contrast, a court could find as a matter of law that either a contract is not
fully integrated 66 or that its terms are ambiguous. 67 In either of these instances,
the parties will submit to the court their understanding of the meaning of the word
or phrase at the time of contract formation. In support of their meaning they will
generally offer evidence of what was said and done by the parties during contract
formation.168 The court should consider "words and conduct in light of all the
circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable, it is
given great weight."' 69 Beyond normal, everyday meaning of a word, it is the
express meaning provided by the parties during contract formation which will
carry the greatest weight when interpreting a contract.'70
Courts have applied contract law to resolve allegations of ambiguity in medi-
ated agreements.' Sometimes, the courts did not have to pierce mediation confi-
165. See Calamari and Perillo, supra n. 124, at §§ 3.2 and 3.4.
166. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 210(1)-(2):
Completely and Partially Integrated Agreements
(1) A completely integrated agreement is an integrated agreement adopted by the parties as
a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
(2) A partially integrated agreement is an integrated agreement other than a completely in-
tegrated agreement.
167. See American States Ins. Co. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 885 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
168. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212:
Interpretation of Integrated Agreement
(1) The interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning of the terms of
the writing or writings in the light of the circumstances, in accordance with the rules stated
in this Chapter.
(2) A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the trier
of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable
inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence. Otherwise a question of interpretation of
an integrated agreement is to be determined as a question of law.
169. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202:
Article I. Rules in Aid of Interpretation
(I) Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances and if the
principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.
(2) A writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction
are interpreted together.
(3) Unless a different intention is manifested, where language has a generally prevailing
meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning; technical terms and words of art
are given their technical meaning when used in a transaction within their technical field.
(4) Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with
knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other,
any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great
weight in the interpretation of the agreement. Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of
intention of the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted as consistent with each
other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.
170. See id. § 203(a) and (b).
171. Ansley, 2002 WL 1991193 (determining that the ambiguous terms of mediation settlement
agreement included husband's stock options obtained after the signing of the mediated settlement
agreement but prior to the issuance of the actual divorce decree); Cleveland Trencher Co., 2002 WL
31272366 (disagreeing with party's assertion that there were two reasonable interpretations of a clause
and found the agreement unambiguous as a matter of law).
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dentiality because it found the agreement was not ambiguous and should be inter-
preted within the four comers of the document. 72 In some cases, courts found the
mediated agreement was not ambiguous, but pierced mediation confidentiality in
the process of making that determination.1 73 Finally, some courts have found that
the mediated agreement was ambiguous, and pierced mediation confidentiality to
ascertain the parties' intentions at the time of contract formation.
174
C. Strict Confidentiality Interferes with the Application of Contract Law
to Mediated Agreements
At this point, a sampling of cases in which parties have petitioned courts to
intervene in the enforcement of mediated agreements has been identified. The
resolution of those cases has been demonstrated utilizing an unfettered approach
to contract law. The resolution of most of these cases would be dramatically dif-
ferent under a strict standard of mediation confidentiality.
1. The Discussions and Negotiations in Formulating Mediated Agreements
are often Necessary to Apply Contract Law in Enforcement Proceedings
and Exactly Forbidden by Strict Mediation Confidentiality
The discussions and negotiations in formulating the contract are frequently
integral to a contract law analysis. 175 The essentialness or materiality of a term
could depend on whether that term had been discussed during the negotiations.
176
The determination of duress or coercion requires evidence of the allegedly intimi-
dating statements and behaviors and their impact on the coerced party.' 77 Whether
172. Jaynes, 2001 WL 1176424 (rebutting a claim that a party was entitled to a hearing to resolve a
factual dispute regarding the parties' intent by finding the written mediated agreement was complete
and unambiguous); Dodd v. Joy, 1999 WL 140163 (Tex. App. Mar. 17, 1999); In re Marriage of
Schieber, 1998 WL 764454 (Wash. App. Div. 1 Nov. 4, 1998). See also Tarrant Dist. Inc., 127 F.3d
375; Granger v. Granger, 804 S.2d 217 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (finding agreement was final and bind-
ing and the potential ambiguity could be clarified by a motion to the trial court).
173. Exparte Littlepage, 796 S. 2d 298 (Ala. 2001) (overturning a lower court's finding of ambiguity,
but considering the testimony of the mediator in making that ruling); Lau Family, 2002 WL 997741
(allowing affidavit of a party submitted at trial that revealed the contents of the mediation to be used to
determine that the mediated agreement was clear and unambiguous).
174. Inglish v. Machen, 2001 WL 832356 (Tex. App. July 19, 2001) (considering extrinsic evidence
to interpret an attorney's fees provision in a mediated agreement); Baker, 1999 WL 1318855 (authoriz-
ing a hearing to interpret an ambiguous term in a mediated agreement).
175. See supra § IV.B.1.
176. See Chappell, 548 S.E.2d at 500.
177. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (comparing testimony of various mediation participants to de-
termine that claims of duress were unfounded); Randle, 1996 WL 447954 (overturning summary
judgment enforcing the mediated agreement upon finding possible duress where a party to a mediation
was placed in grave danger that was not warranted under the circumstances; the party had a history of
heart trouble, had not taken his medication that day and was beginning to experience chest pains; when
he informed the mediator of his need to leave and why, he was told that he could not leave until a
settlement was reached); Vitakis-Valchine, 793 S. 2d 1094 (remanding case to determine if mediator
engaged in misconduct by pressuring a party to a divorce mediation by threatening her that he would
tell the judge that it was her fault that a settlement agreement was not reached and that she would never
get custody of frozen embryos and that the parties had five minutes and then had to "get out of here");
FDIC, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736 (finding no duress despite multiple assertions of potential criminal charges
being filed against a party if they did not settle a civil case in the mediation); Berg, 2002 WL
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a mistake was unilateral (relief generally not provided) or mutual (the agreement
is voidable) could be decided by, among other things, whether the alleged mis-
taken term was discussed in the negotiations. 78 Fraud can only be established by
examining the alleged misrepresentation in a negotiation, 179 the state of mind of
the person making the representation, 80 and the reasonableness of the reliance.' 8'
Contracts against public policy, such as waiver of paternal rights without due
process, require an examination of the disclosures and states of mind in the nego-
tiations. 82 Upon finding that a contractual term is ambiguous, the meaning is
determined by determining the parties' intentions at the time of contract forma-
tion. '83
For agreements created in mediations, the discussions and negotiations for-
mulating the agreement are likely to bear on the above types of issues and will
almost certainly have occurred in the mediation. While there are occasions when
critical contract law factors occur pre- or post-mediation, 184 the agreements are
usually concluded during the mediation. The statements and behaviors that sur-
round the formation and acceptance of an agreement will color the meanings and
intentions manifested by the respective parties. It is usually the statements and
behaviors made at the time of contract formation that will be relevant to a court's
determination of a party's intentions and understanding of the terms of the agree-
ment. 85 Since the occurrences within the mediation transformed the parties from
disagreeing to agreeing, it is the occurrences within the mediation that would ex-
plain the what, why, and how of each party's intended consent. 86 While this
31256677 (claiming signature was a product of undue influence because: the mediation took fourteen
hours; she was incapacitated by medications, fatigue and the fact that the mediation was taking place
on the same day as her ex-husband's funeral, her car was struck and sustained substantial damage
during the mediation; and that she was influenced to sign by her attorney; the court found that because
she did not complain or outwardly display any signs of incapacity, her agreement was absent undue
influence).
178. Feldman, 824 S. 2d 274 (observing that the mistaken issue had not been discussed in the media-
tion and, thus, the court reasoned it was a unilateral rather than mutual mistake). See also Bartos, 1990
WL 32385 (reasoning there was no mistake because a term had been discussed in the mediation and
not included in the agreement).
179. Crupi, 784 S. 2d 611 (finding that statements were not sufficiently false to support a claim of
fraud).
180. Palmer, 2002 WL 1288701 (finding a lack of factual support to find that a party's statements
were knowingly false and meant to deceive).
181. Chitkara, 2002 WL 31004729 (finding unreasonable reliance on the false statement as grounds
for denying an allegation of fraud).
182. In re T.D., 28 P.3d 1163.
183. See supra n. 165.
184. See Weddington, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265; Thermos Co., 1998 WL 299469; Schwartz, 1999 WL
170676.
185. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt.b:
Circumstances
The meaning of words and other symbols commonly depends on their context; the meaning
of other conduct is even more dependent on the circumstances. In interpreting the words
and conduct of the parties to a contract, a court seeks to put itself in the position they occu-
pied at the time the contract was made. When the parties have adopted a writing as a final
expression of their agreement, interpretation is directed to the meaning of that writing in
light of the circumstances...The circumstances for this purpose include the entire situation,
as it appeared to the parties, and in appropriate cases may include facts known to one party
which the other had reason to know....
186. See infra nn. 206, 213-15.
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appears to be generally accurate, there are many cases where courts have applied
contract law in proceedings to enforce mediated agreements without piercing me-
diation confidentiality.'87
The contents of a mediation are exactly what mediation confidentiality is in-
tended to protect. If the applicable mediation confidentiality standard does not
provide an exception for enforcement proceedings and is strictly construed as in
the Foxgate case, the very information necessary for the contract law analysis is
unavailable. A recent Texas case provides an example of this result. 88 The plain-
tiffs in Vick sued for breach of a settlement agreement and fraud.,8 9 The defen-
dants sought summary judgment on the fraud cause of action because plaintiffs
could not offer any evidence of false representations made to plaintiffs. 19° In re-
sponse, plaintiff's affidavit listed numerous false representations defendants made
during a mediation.' 91 The trial and appellate courts agreed with defendant that all
alleged misrepresentations in the mediations were confidential. 192 Since the plain-
tiff did not meet his burden of proof to identify admissible false representations,
his suit was dismissed on summary judgment. 193
Note that Foxgate distinguished Olam on the grounds that in Olam both par-
ties waived mediation confidentiality -- not by distinguishing it as an enforcement
proceeding compared to Foxgate's sanction's context. 94 The implication is that
Olam would not have been distinguishable had one party asserted mediation con-
fidentiality.
In strict mediation confidentiality jurisdictions, parties in enforcement pro-
ceedings will need to proceed without access to statements or materials occurring
in or developed during the mediation process. When a party is not permitted to
disclose what happened in a mediation, he will be hard pressed to prove an alleged
defect in the making or implementation of a mediated agreement.1
95
2. Strict Mediation Confidentiality Transforms Mediated Agreements into
Super Contracts
By depriving courts of the information necessary to employ a standard con-
tract law analysis, strict mediation confidentiality has the effect of transforming
the mediated agreement into a "super contract."'' 96 Courts dealing with the en-
187. Chappell, 548 S.E.2d 499; Jaynes, 2001 WL 1176424; In re Kasschau, 11.S.W.3d 305; Walk
Haydel & Assoc. Inc., 720 S. 2d 372; Stempel, 633 S. 2d 26; Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d 428; Cleveland
Trencher Company, 2002 WL 31272366; Palmer, 2002 WL 1288701; Liquidation of Prof. Med. Ins.
Co., 2002 WL 1396084; Thermos Co., 1998 WL 299469; Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398; F&K Supply Inc., 732
N.Y.S.2d 734; Ansley, 2002 WL 1991193; Tarrant, 127 F.3d 375; Schieber, 1998 WL 764454
Grimes, 997 S.W.2d 877; Granger, 804 S.2d 217; Clayton, 1999 WL 89945.
188. Vick, 2002 WL 1163842.
189. Id. at *1.
190. Id. at *1.
191. Id. at *3.
192. Id. at *3.
193. Id. at *4.
194. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1127 (noting that Olam was a settlement enforcement proceeding and is
distinguishable because parities waived confidentiality).
195. See Vick, 2002 WL 1163842 at *4.
196. Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil, Remarks, Olam Revisited (S. Cal. Mediation Association An-
nual Conference, Nov. 4, 2000).
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forcement of mediated agreements would have to choose between a hamstrung
attempt in applying contract law or a more carte blanche deference to the medi-
ated agreement.
A court could enforce strict mediation confidentiality by applying contract
law analysis without piercing the sanctity of the mediation. 197 Without access to
what would probably be the critical evidence, the party with the burden of proof
would lose. A party seeking to set aside a mediated agreement (alleging fraud,
coercion, mistake, unconscionability, or a lack of agreement on essential terms)
would be prohibited from introducing the usual type of evidence because of strict
confidentiality. 198 In this instance, strict mediation confidentiality deprives the
party objecting to the agreement of access to the evidence that could prove his
point. The compromised ability to challenge the contract creates a more binding
than usual agreement: thus, the term "super contract."'
99
The other way a court could enforce strict mediation confidentiality could be
to rule that agreements reached in mediation are not subject to the same scrutiny
as other agreements. 200 This judicial deference to mediated agreements could be
justified because the creation of the agreement was supervised.2° On the other
hand, this judicial deference could be critiqued because of the vast range in media-
tor qualifications and sophistication, 2 2 and because some alleged abuses could be
mediator initiated.2 °3 In any event, exaggerated judicial deference to mediated
agreements again creates a "super contract."
3. The Mediated Super Contract Has Serious Ramifications
As super contracts, mediated agreements in strict mediation confidentiality
jurisdictions are effectively exempt from the established standards for the en-
forcement of agreements: contract common law. These standards evolved over
centuries to protect parties from abuses or injustices in the enforcement of agree-
ments. Strict mediation confidentiality essentially deprives mediation participants
of many of the protections embodied in contract law principles.
204
197. For example, the court in Vick noted that a cause of action for fraudulent inducement was still
appropriate, but that evidence from the mediation could not be admitted in support of the claim.
198. See Vick, 2002 WL 1163842 at *4.
199. The fact scenario in Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah App. 1999) illustrates how this judi-
cial approach could also raise the bar for the party trying to prove the existence of an enforceable
mediated agreement.
200. See Chappell, 548 S.E.2d at 500 (quoting the appellate court's reasoning that the "defendants
must overcome a 'strong presumption that a settlement reached by the parties through court-ordered
mediation under the guidance of a mediator is a valid contract."' The court later declared "[wie recog-
nize that settlement of claims is favored in the law, and that mediated settlement as a means to resolve
disputes should be encouraged and afforded great deference.").
201. See e.g. Cal. Civil Code § 646.5 (providing an expedited enforcement of settlement agreements
that have been put on the record before a court).
202. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Professional
Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 235,239 (2002).
203. See e.g. Vitakis-Valchine, 793 S.2d 1094.
204. Cf. Cadle Co. v. Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Tex. App. 1995) (splitting en banc court 10 to 2
declaring a summary proceeding to enforce mediated agreements was contrary to public policy be-
cause "it effectively deprives a party of the right to be confronted by appropriate pleadings, assert
defenses, conduct discovery, and submit contested factual issues to judge or jury). See also Mantas v.
Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1996) (finding that a party seeking enforcement of
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Where protections are absent, abuses could flourish. While mediation confi-
dentiality protects and empowers participants in their moment of apprehension, it
also makes parties vulnerable to the unscrupulous in enforcement proceedings.
20 5
For example, an individual intending abusive negotiation strategies (like fraud or
coercion) could insist on negotiating in a mediation and then cling to his right of
confidentiality when enforcing the suspect agreement. Mediation of transactional
agreements and estate planning processes could expand as a way to increase the
durability of those agreements/legal documents. Again, the unscrupulous heir
planning to exert undue influence in the making of a will might request the par-
ticipation of a "mediator" so the content of the estate planning conversations
would be shielded.
Finally, the competent drafting of a mediated agreement must be emphasized.
As a super contract, many of the usual remedies for incomplete drafting will not
be available. For example, there is no remedy for a scrivener's $600,000 error.
Thus, mediation participants must employ a heightened degree of scrutiny when
drafting and reviewing the mediated agreement in a strict mediation confidential-
ity jurisdiction.
D. This Clash of Titans (Contract Common Law in Enforcement Proceed-
ings v. Mediation Confidentiality) has Resulted in Unpredictable Legal
Outcomes and Reasoning
An examination of case law regarding the enforcement of mediated agree-
ments reveals diametrically conflicting legal outcomes and four judicial ap-
proaches. There are cases in which courts have hindered the application of con-
tract law because of mediation confidentiality with and without explanation, and
cases in which courts have pierced mediation confidentiality to apply contract law,
also with and without explanation. Such a variety of approaches is not surprising
considering the important values behind mediation confidentiality and contract
common law in enforcement proceedings. An analysis of the legal decisions in
this area will provide context in evaluating the UMA's proposed uniform standard
on this issue.
1. Piercing Mediation Confidentiality Without Explanation
It may be surprising that the vast majority of the time, when enforcing a me-
diated agreement, courts act as if mediation confidentiality did not exist.20 6 If this
a written mediated settlement agreement from which the other party had withdrawn consent "must
pursue a separate breach-of-contract claim, which is subject to the normal rules of pleading and proof'
before a judgment can be rendered).
205. Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties With Their Statements During Negotiation: Demys-
ticizing the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and Mediation-Privilege Statutes, 75
Wash. L. Rev. 1037 (2000).
206. See Golding, 539 S.E.2d 735 (ruling that extrinsic evidence should not have been admitted to
ascertain the intentions of the parties to a mediated agreement because of a condition precedent: media-
tion confidentiality was not mentioned.); Littlepage, 796 S. 2d 298 (reviewing trial record replete with
mediator and party testimony about what occurred at the mediation and then discussing a more limited
use of parol evidence in contract interpretation cases: mediation confidentiality was never addressed.);
Coulter, 21 P.3d 1078 (resolving issue of whether a mediated agreement was contingent upon the
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plaintiff signing a release by, among other things, considering a mediator's affidavit which stated that
it was his custom to advise the parties that the attorneys would prepare a release, that he had no reason
to believe that he did not make the same comments to the parties in this action and that he was confi-
dent that the parties understood that the attorneys would prepare a release: mediation confidentiality
was never mentioned); Sunburst Estates 11, 2001 WL 1515815 (observing, without mentioning media-
tion confidentiality, that at the time the mediated agreement was signed, the attorney for one side did
not recall anything being said regarding ratification or about the representative for his organization's
lacking authority); Vitakis-Valchine, 793 S. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that the medi-
ated agreement could be set aside due to mediator's misconduct - which was alleged by a party reveal-
ing what the mediator did and said in the mediation. When describing Florida's court annexed media-
tion system, the court noted that "[clommunications during the mediation are privileged and confiden-
tial" but never explained why the mediator and party testified regarding mediation communications);
Lype, 1998 WL 734429 (considering plaintiffs' affidavits claiming their former attorney misrepre-
sented "the nature and consequences of the mediation proceeding and coerced them into signing the
agreement": mediation confidentiality was never explained); Custom Blending Intl, 1998 WL 842289
(finding that a duress claim failed as a matter of law because, among other things, the party claiming to
have been coerced admits it never complained to the mediator about the allegedly coercive behavior:
mediation confidentiality was never acknowledged.); Crupi, 784 S. 2d 611 (declaring, "[h]owever, at
the evidentiary hearing on her motion to set aside [the mediated settlement agreement], which was
entirely appropriate and necessary, the parties focused on the factors necessary to determine 'fair-
ness."' The court recounted the testimony of a witness to the mediation about whether the appellant
was in her right mind and thought she had come to an agreement that day: mediation confidentiality
was never explained); In re Marriage of Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160 (considering the statements of the
mediator in the mediation when considering claims of duress and undue influence without explaining
the breach of mediation confidentiality); Graf, 1998 WL 297519 (noting that at an evidentiary hearing
to enforce a mediated agreement both parties agreed that plaintiff should testify to statements [by his
attorney] at the mediation that were the basis of his fraud or mistake claim); Chitkara, 2002 WL
31004729 (determining that reliance on a certain type of mediator statement in a mediation cannot
serve as the basis for fraud or material misrepresentation: mediation confidentiality was never ad-
dressed); Brinkerhoff, 99 Wash. App. at 699-700 (finding that the supporting declarations revealed the
contents of the mediation and remanded "for an evidentiary hearing in which the parties are entitled to
call and cross-examine witnesses to resolve factual disputes about what was said on the day of the
mediation": mediation confidentiality was never considered); Herrin v. The Med. Prot. Co., 89
S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App. 2002) (reviewing summary judgment that dismissed multiple causes of actions
arising out of a mediation, the appellate court reviewed the record revealing the contents of the media-
tion and found genuine issues of material fact: mediation confidentiality was never addressed); Gel-
fand, 2002 WL 1397037 (resolving an allegation that a party had not voluntarily assented to a medi-
ated settlement agreement by considering declarations revealing mediation communications by the
mediator and attorneys: mediation confidentiality was never addressed); Berg, 2002 WL 31256677
(determining the enforceability of a mediated agreement by relying on declarations and testimony at a
hearing that centered on alleged statements made at the mediation: mediation confidentiality was never
discussed); Brown, 2002 WL 1343222 at *4, n. 5 (noting where in a proceeding to enforce a mediated
agreement the trial court sustained an objection with instructions for the attorneys to not "get into
anything discussed at settlement - mediation" but ultimately created a record replete with references to
statements at the mediation); Dodd, 1999 WL 140163 (where in a hearing to determine, among other
things, whether a mediated agreement's provision to appoint appraisers in the future constituted an
"agreement to agree," the trial court accepted testimony as to why the identity of the appraisers was
left open: mediation confidentiality was never addressed); Baker, 1999 WL 1318855 (where a deci-
sion authorizing the admissibility of parol evidence to interpret a mediated agreement never mentions
mediation confidentiality); Lau Family, 2002 WL 997741 (where affidavits revealing the contents of
the mediation were considered before determining that extrinsic evidence should only be admissible if
the contract is ambiguous: mediation confidentiality was never raised.); Pruncutz v. Quinney, 2001 WL
1627650 (Tex, App. Dec. 20, 2001) (where a jury resolving an issue of interpreting a term in a medi-
ated agreement heard testimony about statements in the mediation: confidentiality was not addressed);
Inglish, 2001 WL 832356 (where the extrinsic evidence used to interpret an ambiguous term in a
mediated agreement included testimony from both parties and their attorneys about their understand-
ings at the time it was drafted: mediation confidentiality was never mentioned).
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approach is justified by statute, it is rarely explained.0 7 Rather, the issue is usu-
ally not discussed, possibly because counsel failed to raise the confidentiality
objection.2 °8 Inadmissible evidence is regularly admitted unless one of the parties
objects.20 9  The reasons attorneys failed to raise mediation confidentiality in en-
forcement proceedings (strategic consideration, expectation/knowledge that courts
would be hostile to such an objection, or ignorance of the possibility) would make
an interesting study. This ignorance of mediation confidentiality in enforcement
proceedings is especially appalling when it occurs after a higher court has de-
clared that judicial exceptions to mediation confidentiality are impermissible.2 t °
2. Piercing Mediation Confidentiality With Explanation
There are a number of cases in which mediation confidentiality has been
raised in enforcement proceedings and the courts have explained why it was nec-
essary to pierce confidentiality. The easy case is when there is statutory authority
for piercing mediation confidentiality.211 Other explanations have included theo-
ries of overt waiver based on the parties' agreement or behavior, 2 12 and implied
waiver that emanated from initiating proceedings to enforce or set aside a medi-
ated agreement.213 Other explanations have looked to the purposes and legislative
intent of mediation confidentiality. 2t 4 Still others considered the duty of a public
215
court to do justice in light of competing constitutional or public policy interests.
207. Id. (the facts and texts of the opinions in supra n. 206 support this contention).
208. See Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 809 n.8. But see Brown, 2002 WL 1343222 at *4, n.5 (noting that
where even after having such an objection sustained, one court then appeared to disregard its own
ruling and consider multiple accounts of what was said and done in a mediation).
209. Kenneth S. Brown et al., McCormick on Evidence, §52 (5th ed. 1999).
210. See e.g, Gelfand, 2002 WL 1397037; Berg, 2002 WL 31256677 (both cases were decided after
the California Supreme Court published its decision in Foxgate).
211. See. e.g. Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, 2001 WL 1659516 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2001)
(where the court explained it was permitting evidence from the mediator regarding whether an agree-
ment had been reached because it satisfied the statutory standard of "circumstances in which a court
finds that the interest of justice outweighs the need for confidentiality").
212. See Howard, 2001 WL 228015 (noting that the parties agreed to resolve a dispute regarding the
terms of a mediated agreement by abiding by the understanding of a relatively objective third party's
understanding of what was agreed to; their claim of mediation confidentiality on appeal was dis-
missed); Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("[t]he Court fully recognizes the
importance and gravity of the rules of confidentiality governing mediation. However, because the
plaintiffs 'opened the door' by attacking the professionalism and integrity of the mediator and media-
tion process, this Court was compelled, in the interests of justice, to breach the veil of confidential-
ity."). See also Moore, 2001 WL 490777 at *1, n.l. But see DR Lakes Inc., 819 S. 2d 971 (noting that
the court rejected the waiver rationale when counsel discussed what occurred during the mediation at a
non-jury hearing on the motion to enforce settlement and in response to the other party's opening
statement, prior to the court ruling on the privilege issue).
213. Randle, 1996 WL 447954 (noting where the court ruled that a party cannot sue for specific
performance of the mediated agreement while at the same time assert mediation confidentiality over
the mediation communications at the heart of opposing party's duress defense); McKinlay, 648 S. 2d at
810 (noting where the appellate court found that a wife seeking to set aside a mediated agreement by
challenging the conduct and integrity of the mediation proceedings could not with only her side oi the
story presented, [invoke] a statutory privilege to preclude testimony or a proffer from other witnesses
such as the mediator. ". . . [Ilt was error and a breach of fair play to deny husband the opportunity to
present rebuttal testimony and evidence").
214. See DR Lakes, 819 S. 2d at 974 (noting where the court pierced mediation confidentiality by
reasoning that "[m]ediation could not take place if litigants had to worry about admissions against
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3. Uphold Mediation Confidentiality With Explanation
Perhaps tellingly, there are comparatively few cases explaining why a court
upheld mediation confidentiality in an enforcement proceeding.21 6 The Vick court
relied on a strict statutory construction declaring: "The Texas ADR Act does not
include an exception for claims of fraud, and this court will not create an excep-
tion to the confidentiality provisions of the Texas ADR Act." 217 The court in
Willis v. McGraw canceled a hearing on a motion to enforce a mediated settlement
agreement and denied the motion, citing that a bright line rule of non court in-
volvement is appropriate to assure the salutary purposes of mediation confidential-
ity, to wit: "to reassure the parties and counsel they would suffer no prejudice,
perceived or actual, as a result of the full, frank, conciliatory, and sometimes
heated, exchanges that occur inevitably during the mediation process. 1 ,8 The
court in Lyons v. Booker generally cited the same reasons as the Willis court, and
felt so strongly about it that they ordered the existing motion and moving papers
that breached confidentiality sealed, recused the three appellate judges who were
privy to the breach from further proceedings in this case, admonished counsel, and
interest being offered into evidence at trial, if a settlement was not reached. Once the parties in media-
tion have signed an agreement, however, the reasons for confidentiality are not as compelling. We
cannot imagine that the legislature intended that a party to a contract reached after mediation should
not have the same access to the courts to correct a $600,000 mutual mistake, as a party entering into
the same contract outside of mediations."); Feldman, 824 S. 2d 274 (upholding the piercing of media-
tion confidentiality in a proceeding to enforce a mediated agreement citing DR Lakes Inc.); F.D.I.C.,
76 F. Supp. 2d 736 (noting that "the Court does not read the ADRA or its sparse legislative history as
creating an evidentiary privilege that would preclude a litigant from challenging the validity of a set-
tlement agreement based on events that transpired at a mediation. Indeed such a privilege would
effectively bar a party from raising well-established common law defenses such as fraud, duress,
coercion, and mutual mistake. It is unlikely that Congress intended such a draconian result under the
guise of preserving the integrity of the mediation process."); Few v. Hammock Enterprises Inc., 132
N.C. App. 291 (N.C. App. 1999) (where the court makes a distinction between when a judge is deter-
mining whether the parties reached an agreement and its terms, on one hand, and when a finder of fact
is determining the merits of either the present or future substantive claims, on the other hand see also
Deason, supra n.1, at 57-58, for a discussion of how the Few decision instigated statutory changes in
North Carolina.)). See also Cain, 813 S. 2d at 904 cert. denied, (Murdock, J., dissenting) (reasoning
that "[tihe use of the mediation process does not immunize the resulting contract from scrutiny under
otherwise applicable substantive law pertaining to the enforceability of contract"; he argues that me-
diation confidentiality should be similar to Rule 408 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence regarding
inadmissibility of offers of compromise in settlement discussions "to prove liability for or invalidity of
the claim or its amount" but not inadmissible if asserted as a defense to a claim if the settlement
agreement is being sued upon).
215. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110; see also supra § III; Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (noting where
the court authorized piercing mediation confidentiality to allow impeachment of inconsistent testimony
in a civil proceeding in which a party's liberty is at risk (juvenile delinquency) and thus constitutional
due process concerns are triggered). See also Avary, 72 S.W.3d 779 (overturning summary judgment
after noting that actions to enforce mediated settlement agreements implicate confidentiality concerns
related to "(i) the parties intent in entering into a settlement agreement, (ii) any ambiguity in the
agreement, and (iii) affirmative defenses to a claim for breach of the agreement mediation," the court
held that plaintiff should be allowed to pierce mediation confidentiality to pursue a new and independ-
ent tort alleged to have been perpetrated during the course of the mediation).
216. Vick, 2002 WL 1163842; Willis v. McGraw, 177 F.R.D. 632 (S.D. W.Va. 1998); Lyons, 982 P.2d
1142; Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
217. Vick, 2002 WL 1163842 at *3.
218. Willis, 177 F.R.D. at 632 (referencing "the analogous setting of preargument conferences in the
courts of appeal" and citing precedence for maintaining the confidentiality of those conferences).
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threatened that further violations may subject counsel to more severe sanctions.219
The Smith court upheld a magistrate's quashing of a subpoena for a mediator, but
declined to adopt the recognition of a privilege declaring that conferring a new
privilege will require carefully balancing the competing interests: the perceived
need to preserve the appearance of the mediator's impartiality, and neutrability
against the rights of litigants to obtain all available evidence.22 °
4. Uphold Mediation Confidentiality Without Explanation
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of West Virginia signaled that
court's belief that at least the mediator's confidentiality should not be breached in
proceedings to enforce mediated agreements. 221 After two hearings on the matter,
the trial court ordered the Riners to execute an expanded "Settlement Agreement
and Release" prepared by Newbraugh in addition to the mediated settlement
agreement prepared by the mediator, which the Riners had already signed - but
was objected to by Newbraugh.222 On review, the court first clarified that West
Virginia Trial Court Rule 25.14 providing, "If the parties reach a settlement and
execute a written agreement, the agreement is enforceable in the same manner as
any other written contract" does not provide the exclusive means for the enforce-
223
ment of mediated settlement agreements. While discussing whether the addi-
tional terms in Newbraugh's agreement were material, the court went out of its
way to express concern about the extent of mediator testimony. The court cited
West Virginia Trial Court Rule 25.12 providing that "mediator[s] may not be
subpoenaed or called to testify or otherwise be subject to process requiring disclo-
sure of confidential information in any proceeding relating to or arising out of the
dispute mediated., 224 The court noted that while neither party has raised the issue,
it was concerned because "the trial court's questioning of the mediator went be-
yond the basic issue of whether in fact an agreement was reached and identified
the terms of that agreement. ,22' The Riner court identified conflicting court rules:
one providing that mediated agreements are enforceable in the same manner as
any other written agreement; another providing that mediators may not testify
226regarding confidential information arising out of the dispute mediated. Without
acknowledging the tension in these rules, the court made clear that in West Vir-
ginia, the mediator's confidentiality will take precedence in proceedings to en-
force mediated agreements.
7
219. Lyons, 982 P.2d at 1144.
220. The same judge decided Datapoint Corp. v. Picturetel Corp., 1998 WL 25536 at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 14, 1998) four years later where he ordered a mediated agreement and its terms disclosed declar-
ing ". . . even if this order has some chilling impact on parties' willingness to settle, this is simply the
price for allowing litigants to explore some of the most basic and fundamental issues that arise in
litigation -- witness and party bias and prejudice."
221. Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 808.
222. Id. at 805.
223. Id. at 805-806.
224. Id. at 808.
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This variety of outcomes -- either maintaining or piercing confidentiality in
enforcement proceeding -- and of judicial reasoning is not desirable. One objec-
tive of the law is to provide predictable standards by which citizens can order their
affairs. 228 Clarifying when and how mediation confidentiality will be pierced in
proceedings to enforce mediated agreements will be a significant contribution of
the UMA for adopting jurisdictions.
V. THE UMA PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION TO MEDIATION
CONFIDENTIALITY FOR THE PARTIAL APPLICATION OF CONTRACT LAW
WHEN ENFORCING MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
The UMA is an improvement for strict mediation confidentiality jurisdictions
because it explicitly acknowledges that, at times, mediation confidentiality must
defer. One of the designated exceptions to mediation confidentiality is "a pro-
ceeding to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a
contract arising out of mediation."229 While this exception provides the means to
apply contract law when enforcing mediated agreements, the UMA reflects a
strong commitment to the interests of mediation confidentiality by imposing nu-
merous conditions and one problematic limitation on the implementation of the
exception.
A. The Conditions to Exercise the Exception
In order to exercise the exception to mediation confidentiality, the UMA re-
quires an in camera determination by a judge, administrative agency, or arbitrator
that all the other conditions have been satisfied.230 The UMA only authorizes
exceptions to mediation confidentiality in supervised settings after specific find-
ings by a neutral authority. That neutral authority must utilize an in camera proc-
ess when making its findings 23' so as to still substantially maintain the protections
of mediation confidentiality.
The evidence sought by breaching mediation confidentiality must not be oth-
232erwise available. Mediation confidentiality should not be pierced because it is
the easier way to acquire evidence available by other means. This extreme rem-
edy is only available in situations where it is the only means to a significant end.
This provision demonstrates the UMA's commitment to protecting mediation
confidentiality if possible, but also acknowledges that when enforcing a mediated
agreement, the necessary evidence sometimes requires the disclosure of the con-
tents of the mediation. 
3
W
Finally, the need for the evidence must substantially outweigh the interest in
protecting confidentiality. 234 While some commentators have expressed concern
228. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Harv. L. Rev. 10, 457 (1897).




233. See generally supra § IV.C. 1.
234. U.M.A. § 6(b)(2).
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about this requirement,2 35 it should not be problematic in the context of enforcing
a settled case. Courts have already noted that the interest in protecting mediation
confidentiality is diminished in the context of enforcing a mediated agreement.
23 6
The primary fear that statements in the mediation would be used against the
speaker if the case failed to settle is absent. Indeed, if the parties intend the medi-
ated agreement to be enforceable, that alone could be construed as a waiver of
mediation confidentiality for enforcement purposes. 237 Possibly, the more egre-
gious allegations of wrongdoing in a mediation, like fraud or coercion, would both
enhance the need for evidence and diminish the interest in protecting confidential-
ity and thus access the exception to mediation confidentiality.
B. The Scope of the Exception
If the above conditions are satisfied, mediation confidentiality can be pierced
in "a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind or reform, or a defense to avoid liabil-
ity on a contract arising out of mediation. 2 38 Since the contents of a mediation
become admissible in a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind, either the moving
or resisting party would be able to pierce mediation confidentiality. Thus, should
a party be able to object to a contract without piercing mediation confidentiality,
the responding party might be able to pierce mediation confidentiality if necessary
in his defense of the contract.
Rescind means "to abrogate or cancel a contract unilaterally or by agreement"
or "to make void; to repeal or annul., 239 Reform refers to reformation which is
"an equitable remedy by which a court will modify a written agreement to reflect
the actual intent of the parties, usually to correct fraud or mutual mistake . 2.."240
It is the mechanism for correcting inadvertent or intentional errors in the "content
or legal effect of the writing."241 Reformation limits courts to modifying the writ-
ing reflecting the agreement, and should not apply to affect the underlying agree-
ment.242 While the usual remedy for duress is to rescind the contract, reformation
235. See Hughes, supra n. 1, at 42-44 (stating that the author believes the "substantially outweigh"
standard is "vague" and "unworkable" and will be extremely difficult to apply due to the case by case
contextually dependent nature of the test).
236. See DR Lakes Inc., 819 S.2d at 974; Feldman, 824 S.2d at 276-77; Sharon Motor Lodge, 2001
WL 1659516.
237. See Deason, supra n. 1, at 52-53.
238. U.M.A. § 6(b)(2).
239. Black's Law Dictionary 1308 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). See also e.g. Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. § 1689 (West 2002):
"The ability to rescind a contract is available when there has been a breach in the execution of the
contract.. or where there has been fraud, duress or undue influence in the creation of the contract, if
one of the party's consideration fails and/or the contract is deemed to be illegal." Id.
240. Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 239, at 1285.
241. See Calamari & Perillo, supra n. 124, § 9.35 ("Misrepresentations concerning the qualities of the
subject matter or other factors which affect the desirability of the bargain or economic equivalence of
the exchange are not grounds for reformation. Such relief would require the court to remake the
agreement itself").
242. Calamari and Perillo state:
Note the limited scope for reformation. Contracts are not reformed for mistake, writings are. The
distinction is crucial. With rare exceptions, courts have been tenacious in refusing to remake a bargain
entered into because of mistake. They will, however, rewrite a writing that does not express the bar-
20031
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has been utilized to rewrite an agreement to conform to an earlier understanding,
the terms of which were modified by duress in the final written contract.
243
Note that the scope of proceedings in which piercing mediation confidential-
ity is authorized is broader than currently allowed by some states.244 Rescission
and reformation are contract law remedies designed to undo the agreements or
reconstruct their written terms. Consideration should be given to whether refer-
encing two general contract law remedies and all defenses is broad enough to
ensure access to the breadth of contract law in all possible enforcement proceed-
ings.245  For example, an enforcement proceeding might involve a question of
conditions precedent or issues of interpretation in which neither party is request-
ing rescission or reformation.246 The party raising the interpretation issue may
want the writing to stand as written, with a specific meaning ascribed to a disputed
term. It might have been better to authorize mediation confidentiality exceptions
when "necessary to enforce a written agreement that came out of mediation ' '24 7 or
declare: "The effect of a mediated settlement agreement shall be determined under
principles of law applicable to contract. 2 48 However, the Riner decision shows
that the standard should specify that mediation should be pierced in enforcement
proceedings.249
C. The Limitation to the Exception
The UMA's authorized piercing of mediation confidentiality is severely lim-
ited. Even if all the above conditions and scope issues are satisfied, mediators
"may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication. ' 25°
Thus, for mediators, the UMA extends the strict mediation confidentiality concept
to the detriment of contract common law in enforcement proceedings.
In a contested matter, the absence of potentially the only objective account
will severely handicap a court in applying contract law in enforcement proceed-
ings.2 5 1 The rationale and results of this dual standard between participants and
mediators are suspect. 252 The cases in which courts have depended upon mediator
testimony while resolving contract law enforcement issues are myriad.253
gain. Stated another way, courts give effect to the expressed wills of the parties; they will not second
guess what the parties would have agreed to if they had known the facts.
Calamari & Perillo, supra n. 124, §9.35.
243. Id. (citing with approval Leben v. Nassau Sav. & Loan Assn., 337 N.Y.S.2d 310 (N.Y. App. Div.
1972)).
244. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.023(C)(4)
(Anderson 1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 904.085(4)(e) (West 2000) (authorizing the piercing of mediation
confidentiality only for fraud or to prevent manifest injustice); See also supra § III.
245. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(e) (1981) (using, in a different context, the stan-
dard of "ground for granting or denying rescission, reformation, specific performance or other rem-
edy").
246. See e.g Lerer, 2002 WL 31656109.
247. See e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-235d(b)(2) (West 2002).
248. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.35 (1) (West 2003).
249. See discussion of the Riner case, supra § IV.D.4.
250. U.M.A. §§ 6(b)(2)-(c).
251. Deason states: "In practical terms, a mediator's testimony may be crucial to evaluating the
contract defense." Deason, supra n. 1, at 90.
252. See Hughes, supra n. 1.
253. Littlepage, 796 S.2d 303; Riner, 563 S.E.2d 802; Coulter, 21 P.3d 1078; Feldman, 824 S.2d 274.
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VI. THE UMA's EXCEPTION TO MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY WHEN
ENFORCING MEDIATED AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE EXPANDED
The UMA is seriously flawed in excluding the mediator from providing evi-
dence of a mediation communication in enforcement proceedings. Note that Sec-
tion 6's Exception to Privilege isolates contract enforcement proceedings and
participant misconduct or malpractice proceedings as the only two areas where a
confidentiality exception exists for all others, but not for mediators. Mediator
testimony about the mediation is specifically authorized:
* When there is an intentional plan to commit a crime in the future or to
conceal current criminal activity;
254
e If there have been any threats of bodily harm, the discussion of a plan
to commit a crime involving bodily harm or any other crime of vio-
lence;2
55
* An "open records" statute or other requirement of law that prevents
mediations of a certain type to be open to the public or at least not sub-
ject to concealment; 256
e To prove or disprove a complaint of professional misconduct or mal-
practice filed against a mediator;
257
* Offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploi-
tation of a child or adult;
258
* A court proceeding involving a felony or misdemeanor.
259
The requirements of a finding by a neutral authority that the evidence is not
otherwise available and that the need for evidence substantially outweighs the
interest in protecting confidentiality are prerequisites to breaching mediation con-
fidentiality only in contract enforcement proceedings. Even with these protec-
tions, the UMA maintains mediation confidentiality for the mediator. This media-
tor exemption will have the effect of maintaining the strict mediation confidential-
ity approach for many cases. The result will be that many courts will need to
resolve contract enforcement issues without the benefit of contract law.
The UMA's approach of piercing mediation confidentiality in enforcement
proceedings for the parties only and not for the mediator will interfere with the
application of contract law when enforcing mediated agreements in at least the
following circumstances:
254. U.M.A. § 6(a)(4).
255. U.M.A. § 6(a)(3).
256. U.M.A. § 6(a)(2).
257. U.M.A. § 6(a)(5).
258. U.M.A. § 6(a)(7).
259. U.M.A. § 6(b)(1).
2003]
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A. Conflicting Factual Testimony by the Parties
Hearings about whether an issue was discussed in the mediation or an alleged
scrivener's error could easily result in conflicting testimony by the parties. With-
out the mediator's testimony, in an enforcement proceeding a court will most
likely decide the case by finding one witness more credible than the other 260 or
that there is no agreement because of a failure of definiteness on all essential
terms.2 6'
B. Mediations with a Prevalence of Private Meetings
It is common for mediators to meet privately (caucus) with each party in a
mediation. Many mediations of legal disputes consist of a short joint opening
session and then a series of caucuses. The result is a shuttle diplomacy model of
mediation in which the parties are face to face for an introductory opening and at
the end to confirm the mediated agreement or declare impasse. 26  In this kind of
mediation, the negotiations and discussions often critical to the application of
contract law occur between the mediator and a party and/or party's attorney. The
UMA provides that the only account of these communications available in an
enforcement proceeding will be the party and/or her attorney. Even the most hon-
est party may have a skewed perspective and will be hard pressed to provide an
objective characterization of his conversations with the mediator. Less scrupulous
parties could offer unrebuttable exaggerated testimony. The law may require a
trier of fact to accept as true unrebutted testimony that satisfies a party's burden of
production of evidence.263
260. See e.g. Berg, 2002 WL 31256677; Brown, 2002 WL 1343222; Goodman, 2001 WL 1531187;
Gelfand, 2002 WL 1397037.
261. See Weddington, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (finding a lack of agreement to the terms of a licensing
agreement which was the essence of the parties' conflict); Chappell, 548 S.E.2d 499 (voiding settle-
ment agreement when it was determined that one party had added a "hold harmless" provision that was
not agreed upon nor discussed during the mediation); Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 809 (finding no valid
agreement when one party subsequently added terms that were not discussed during the mediation
which released them from all current and future claims and assigned future expenses related to the
performance of the settlement agreement to the opposing party); Thermos Co., 1998 WL 299469
(determining that the main issue regarding the redesign of the coffee tumbler was never settled, thus,
the mediated agreement was not binding); Schwartz, 1999 WL 170676 (refusing to enforce a settle-
ment agreement because of the lack of agreement as to whether windows in the plaintiff's home would
need to be replaced).
262. See Brinkerhoff, 994 P.2d at 915 (noting that "the two groups spent most of their time in separate
rooms"); Vitakis-Valchine, 793 S.2d 1094 (quoting the mediator's description of "Kissinger-style
shuttle diplomacy" and noting that the other party "had no knowledge of any improper conduct on the
part of the mediator." Note that UMA § 6(a)(5) provides that there is no privilege, even for the media-
tor, when a mediation communication is offered "to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of profes-
sional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator." An interesting question is whether allega-
tions of mediator misconduct in an effort to avoid liability in an enforcement proceeding would be
governed by this provision or by UMA § 6(b)(2)); Berg, 2002 WL 31256677 (noting where counsel
testified that he did not even see the opposing party until after the settlement agreement had been
executed at the conclusion of a fourteen hour mediation). See also Riner, 563 S.E.2d 804 (noting where
the parties left the mediation meeting without an agreement, but the mediator continued his efforts by a
series of telephone calls).
263. Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence §338 (5th ed., West 1999).
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C. Complex Multi-Party Mediations
An exaggerated form of the shuttle diplomacy approach to mediations is
commonly employed in complex disputes with large numbers of parties. For ex-
ample, construction defect or toxic tort cases could involve hundreds to thousands
of parties represented by fifty or more attorneys. 264 It is not unusual for mediators
to work on these cases intermittently for months if not years. There are often days
of mediation meetings with categories of participants. For example, all subcon-
tractors will meet one day; a week later, all the parties with insurance coverage
issues will meet. There are instances where, by design, only the mediator knows
the information critical to the contract law enforcement analysis. An example is
when a mediator amalgamates confidential contributions from a group of defen-
dants for a global settlement. Each defendant's contribution must remain confi-
dential because other defendants and the plaintiff might be irritated if they knew
the exact contributions of certain defendants.
265
If one defendant attempted to renege on his contribution, only the mediator
would know his prior contribution commitment. If evidence from the mediator is
not allowed in this type of complex multi-party case, only the account of the party
attempting to renege on the agreement will be admissible. The result will be me-
diated agreements being transformed from "super contracts" to "vulnerable con-
tracts." The exception to mediation confidentiality in the UMA should be ex-
panded so that if all the other conditions are satisfied, mediators can be compelled
to testify regarding the mediation in an enforcement proceeding.
VII. CONCLUSION
An unfettered application of contact law is desirable in proceedings to enforce
mediated agreements. The current law in some states requires a strict standard of
mediation confidentiality that interferes with the application of contract law in
proceedings to enforce mediated agreements. The UMA authorizes piercing me-
diation confidentiality by anyone except the mediator if certain conditions are
satisfied while enforcing a mediated agreement. The conditions provide reason-
able protection for the interests of mediation confidentiality. The exemption of
mediators from the mediation confidentiality exception when enforcing mediated
agreements has the effect of preventing a meaningful piercing of mediation confi-
dentiality when enforcing many mediated agreements. The exceptions to media-
tion confidentiality in the UMA for enforcing mediated agreements should be
adopted, but should also authorize mediator testimony.
264. See Shawn A. Copeland et al., Current Issues in Toxic Tort Litigation (ALI-ABAA Course of
Study Materials, Toxic Tort and Environmental Matters: Civil Litigation, Course No. SC 64 Jan. 22,
1998) (available in SC 64 ALI-ABA 33, 50-5 1).
265. Retired Federal District Judge Lane Phillips has gone so far as to have each defendant deposit
the money into an escrow account and then issue one check to the plaintiff. Lane Phillips, Presenta-
tion, Does Mediation Work for the Litigating Lawyer? (ABA Mid-Year Conference, Dispute Resolu-
tion Section. Feb. 5. 1999).
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